Empowering The Enemy: The Cold War And The East-West Battle For Information Superiority, 1945 - 1969 by Trembach, Stan
University of South Carolina
Scholar Commons
Theses and Dissertations
2016
Empowering The Enemy: The Cold War And The
East-West Battle For Information Superiority, 1945
- 1969
Stan Trembach
University of South Carolina
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd
Part of the Library and Information Science Commons
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Trembach, S.(2016). Empowering The Enemy: The Cold War And The East-West Battle For Information Superiority, 1945 - 1969.
(Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/3882
  
EMPOWERING THE ENEMY: THE COLD WAR AND THE EAST-WEST BATTLE FOR 
INFORMATION SUPERIORITY, 1945 - 1969 
 
by 
 
Stan Trembach 
 
Bachelor of Arts 
Samara State Pedagogical University, 2002 
 
Master of Arts 
Clemson University, 2004 
 
Master of Library Science 
University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill, 2006 
 
 
 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
 
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
 
Library and Information Science 
 
College of Information and Communications 
 
University of South Carolina 
 
2016 
 
Accepted by: 
 
Samantha K. Hastings, Major Professor  
 
R. David Lankes, Committee Member  
 
Patricia E. Feehan, Committee Member  
 
Charles Bierbauer, Committee Member  
 
Cheryl L. Addy, Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
ii 
 
© Copyright by Stan Trembach, 2016 
All Rights Reserved. 
 
 
 iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 There are many people whose contributions have made this work possible. I 
would like to thank my Dissertation Committee: Samantha K. Hastings (Chair), R. David 
Lankes, Patricia E. Feehan, and Charles Bierbauer for sharing their expertise and 
providing numerous insights and suggestions throughout this research. I would then like 
to thank Dr. Robert V. Williams for encouraging me to pursue this topic and giving me 
invaluable guidance at the initial stages of the project. I want to recognize Bill Sudduth 
for all his assistance with finding and evaluating secondary sources on American and 
foreign information policies.  
I am also indebted to Dr. Eugene Garfield, Bonnie Lawlor, Dr. Toni Carbo, and 
Dr. Tefko Saracevic for generously spending their time with me to share their 
experiences with the Soviet information management system. I am certainly thankful to 
the entire SLIS faculty who provided their feedback and constructive criticism of my 
research at many professional conferences and during private conversations. I would like 
to acknowledge the Institute of Museum and Library Services and the University of 
South Carolina Walker Institute for providing financial support of my research.  
Finally, I am eternally grateful to Liya Deng for her love and care, unflinching 
support, and encouragement that have kept me sane and propelled me forward from the 
beginning of this dissertation until this very day. The journey would not have started and 
would not have been completed without you. 
 iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
This comparative study employs a historical perspective to narrow the gap in the 
existing knowledge of the origins of an information explosion phenomenon that dates 
back to the early decades of the twentieth century. It argues that the root cause of the 
unprecedented growth of the overall amount of documents was the rapid expansion of 
scientific and technical advances across the world and the subsequent spread of modern 
technologies, particularly those applied to scientific and technical information (STI).  
This research is based on the premise that the thriving of the Soviet military-
industrial complex went hand in hand with the rise of the STI management system in the 
mid-twentieth century United States. However, the specific nature of that two-way 
relationship has been insufficiently studied, in part due to information isolation and the 
scarcity of original sources. Reflecting the regime in place, the Soviets and the Western 
world pursued a unique course in managing STI. Using a number of primary and 
secondary sources, this research examines the Soviet centralized system of tightly 
regulated government control over information versus an amalgam of various U.S. 
agencies, jurisdictions, private and even academic institutions playing a role in STI 
gathering, storage, and dissemination.  
Overall, by exploring the practices of a range of the U.S. and Soviet information 
agencies, this research throws additional light on how the United States and the Soviet 
Union handled the Cold War information overload. In doing so, it opens up new
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educational opportunities and informs our judgment about the challenges and possibilities 
in scientific and scholarly research brought about by today’s global information age.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Every era has its defining moment. Arguably, the Cold War period that ensued in 
the wake of World War II saw this moment in 1957 when the governmental, scientific, 
and scholarly establishments in the United Stated were perturbed by the successful launch 
of the Sputnik satellite by the Soviet Union, their political arch-rival for over a decade. 
For all its symbolic significance, Sputnik was not the first or the only wake-up call for the 
West. Less than two years before Sputnik, Rudolf Flesch warned American educators  
that the U.S. educational system was in jeopardy of failing to instruct students in basic 
academic skills, such as reading and literacy (Flesch, 1956). While the first reaction to 
Flesch’s diatribe was that of skepticism, seeing the Soviet satellite as it crossed the sky 
brought home a tangible issue. Not only were American students failing their literacy 
tests, but there was now a distinct need to keep the United States as a nation on par with 
booming Soviet science, mathematics, and space technology (Graves & Dykstra, 1997). 
The launch of Sputnik marked the pinnacle of the ongoing transcontinental race for 
superiority in many areas, most heralded of them being the Space Race. One of the often-
overlooked, but most influential of these areas was information dominance. The East and 
the West treated information, especially information related to science and technology, in 
diverse ways, which impacted the development of social institutions, ideological stances, 
and political agendas in both regions. 
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1.1 Statement of the Problem 
 The Cold War was a period of competition, tension, and conflict between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. As such, it was too complex of a socio-political 
phenomenon to be described in a concise fashion. In the most general of terms, it was 
about the effectiveness in the use of resources for research and development. Both sides 
saw a dramatic expansion of state-funded science and technology research. Government 
and military patronage shaped Cold War techno-scientific practices, imposing methods 
that were project oriented, team based, and subject to national security restrictions. These 
changes affected not just the arms race and the space race but also general research in 
agriculture, biomedicine, computer science, ecology, meteorology, and other fields.  
There exists a substantial body of literature discussing the post-1945 U.S. – Soviet 
relations. The sources cover in great detail seemingly every facet of that relationship--
military, economic, cultural, historical, political, as well as philosophical. This research 
takes a somewhat different approach. It posits that in addition to the above-mentioned 
aspects, the Cold War was also about the race for information superiority that stemmed 
from the unprecedented growth midway through the twentieth century of the overall 
amount of documents, particularly scientific and technical information (STI). In the post-
War United States, a number of federal establishments attempted to develop their own 
strategies of keeping the information overload in check. Such increased attention resulted 
in the steady government support of research and development related to information 
problems and solutions.  
Eastern Europe saw an almost parallel development as the Soviet Union had 
emerged by the 1950s as a powerful military and economic force that sought to establish 
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its superiority over the West in a number of areas, including management of its vast 
amount of information resources (Caponio, Bracken, & Feinstein,1990; Tsvetkova, 
2008). The Soviets succeeded in the latter, particularly after the state-run VINITI (All-
Union Scientific and Technical Information Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the 
USSR) came into existence in the early 1950s. 
In the framework of the Cold War, VINITI as the embodiment of centralized 
orderly power was repeatedly brought up in the Western world as a challenge needing a 
response, although much of its operations remained hidden behind the “Iron Curtain.” 
Although there exists a widely-accepted postulate that the Cold War and the Soviet 
military-industrial complex spurred the rise of the STI management system in the mid-
twentieth century United States (Pospelov & Pospelov, 1990), the specific influence of 
the Soviet STI has been insufficiently studied. The paucity of interpretive scholarship is 
due in part to information isolation and meager original sources, the majority of which 
have been published in the Russian language to never be translated into English. 
Therefore, little is actually known about the influence of the Soviet experience on the 
development of American STI and the institutions that were charged with its 
management. There is also a lack of systematic knowledge regarding the reactions on the 
U.S. soil to how the Soviets approached managing their scientific, research, scholarly, 
and technical information. 
The conceptual differences in STI management manifested themselves in a rigid 
and monolithic system on the Soviet side that stood in stark contrast with a ramified array 
of somewhat compartmentalized American agencies, each of which dealt with its own 
area of focus. Indeed, the Soviets assumed tight control over all their information output 
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through consolidation and central control in one agency, VINITI, as well as state-
controlled libraries. In the West, however, the United States government allowed several 
departments to handle their own documentation, including its storage and release. In 
addition, state and municipal libraries, as well as numerous private libraries, differed in 
their practices regarding document handling and dissemination. Therefore, the crux of 
this study lies in comparing and contrasting the two information handling styles, 
centralized vs. decentralized, to ascertain their impact on society at the time, as well as to 
establish the implications for devising information crisis management strategies in a 
modern Internet and social media-savvy world.  
1.2 Background: The Global Information Crisis Ensues 
 The Soviet Union and the United States had a long history of antagonizing each 
other through political maneuvering, military coalitions, espionage, propaganda, arms 
buildups, economic aid, and proxy wars between other nations in the Eastern and in the 
Western blocs. The two nations fought as allies against Nazi Germany during World War 
II. But the alliance began to crumble rapidly as soon as the war in Europe came to an end 
in May 1945. As the Soviets tightened their grip on Eastern Europe, the United States 
embarked on a policy of containment to prevent the spread of Soviet and Communist 
influence in Western European nations. The tensions resulted in a prolonged and highly 
politicized confrontation that began in the mid-1940s. 
One of the possible interpretations of the information explosion is one that is 
grounded in politics. Adolph Hitler, a master manipulator of people’s will, recognized the 
power of information when he wrote in Mein Kampf  that “the art of propaganda 
[controlled information dissemination] lies in understanding the emotional ideas of the 
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great masses and finding, through a psychologically correct form, the way to the attention 
and thence to the heart of the broad masses” (Hitler, 1925, p. 165). In other words, 
manipulating information so that it elicits the desired response can be viewed as crucial to 
attaining and cementing political power. Thus, governmental control (or lack thereof) 
over information plays a paramount role in the perception of the populace, thus assisting 
or obstructing whatever policies, programs or plans the government wishes to enact. 
While political propaganda is beyond the scope of this study, it recognized the fact that 
the significance of governmental control over scientific and technical information became 
particularly apparent during the Cold War era. 
 The Cold War represented the time following World War II when democracy and 
communism butted heads, with potentially lethal outcomes. Inspired by and building on 
the technological prowess of Nazi Germany, both sides were experiencing a huge 
technology push. It can be safely said that World War II profoundly transformed the 
techno-scientific discipline. The results of scientific activity started to play an 
increasingly important role in shaping the outcome of world developments. Scientists 
themselves grew into national heroes as a nation’s strength came to be determined 
equally by military might and by scientific capability. Yet, despite the growing 
prominence of science on the national and international scene, a significant problem 
reaching emergency proportions plagued all scientific disciplines (Kevles, 1995). This 
internationally recognized problem was truly universal as it concerned all scientists who 
faced the need to deal with exponentially increasing numbers of books, journals, and 
conference papers (Mikhailov, Chernyi, & Giliarevskii, 1985). This overload threatened 
to burden individual researchers with so much documents waiting to be processed that 
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they feared they would be left unable to advance their own ideas, thereby ending or 
compromising the future progress of science. 
Thus, the outburst of scientific knowledge concomitant with the war effort was 
one of the most significant intellectual concerns of the twentieth century. Indeed, the 
scientific mobilization and effort for the war was directed single-mindedly toward 
military success. Consequently, much of that work was classified as secret. However, 
with the end of the war and the loosening of governmental secrecy bans, a large body of 
research was made available through publications (Harris, 1995). 
Immediately following World War II, the Cold War played a key role in 
heightening the sense of an information crisis. This perception was exacerbated in the 
United States by the stunning success of the Soviet Sputnik satellite in 1957 (Colwell, 
2008). The Sputnik launch brought home the realization that American space engineering 
was falling behind that of its Communist counterparts. It then impelled the United States 
to enact reforms in science and engineering education so that the nation could regain 
technological ground it appeared to have lost to its Soviet rival. Furthermore, evidence of 
a vast centralized information network at the Soviet All-Union Institute for Scientific and 
Technical Information (VINITI, or Vsesoyuznyi Institut Nauchnoi i Tekhnicheskoi 
Informatsii), greatly concerned U.S. scientists. Reports indicated that this Institute 
employed twenty thousand abstractors and translators to effectively disseminate 
information to Russian scientists and engineers (Sharp, 1965). This centralized 
government information service seemed to be a huge step toward ameliorating the 
information mismanagement problem on the Soviet soil. 
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The information crisis that emerged after 1945 stemmed from the natural 
perception at the time that scientific growth was out of control. This natural state of 
growth, coupled with the circumstances surrounding the end of World War II and the 
imminent Cold War, gave rise to the crisis-like state of affairs on the information scene 
world over. 
1.3 The German Influence: 1939-1945 
In such conditions, Germany continued to act as a “role model” both the United 
States and the Soviet Union kept an eye on when it came to advancements in science and 
the technical documentation used to describe those. As World War II was gradually 
winding down, the race ensued between the Soviet Union and the United States to seize 
as many German scientists as possible in anticipation of the Cold War. Those efforts 
were to be expected since Germany had entered the Second World War with centuries-
old reputation for scientific and technological leadership, a reputation that was barely 
tarnished by the outcome of the war (Kevles, 1995). To produce cutting-edge means of 
warfare, to prepare for ﬁghting for world domination, Hitler’s Germany adopted in I936 a 
four-year plan of military and industrial development for its economy and armed forces. 
In I943, having suffered a crushing defeat at Stalingrad, it declared total war and 
completely militarized the economies of the Third Reich and enslaved countries. Any 
achievements in science and technology were promptly used in the development and 
serial production of new types of weapons (Irving, 2005). 
In the United States, early attempts at extracting German science and technology 
for industrial purposes were mired in the quagmire of overlapping jurisdictions, military 
and civilian organizations, codenames, and multiple bureaucratic lines of authority. 
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President Truman issued Executive Order 9568 on 8 June 1945 instructing the 
Department of Commerce to establish a Publication Board under its Office of Technical 
Services (OTS), which would be responsible for releasing to industry all scientific and 
technical information developed by the United States during the wartime, pending 
declassification and national security limitations. Executive Order 9604, issued 25 
August 1945, expanded the scope of these orders to include the publication of 'enemy' 
science and technology (Adkinson, 1978).  
Most of the history of U.S. efforts at technical exploitation can be focused on just 
a few agencies. Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee (TIIC) and Field Information 
Agency; Technical (FIAT) shared personnel and had functionally identical missions, each 
assigned to coordinate the efforts of other groups, with the primary functional difference 
being that TIIC was stateside and FIAT based in Germany. The Department of 
Commerce's Office of Technical Services, headed by John Green, was the public face of 
these efforts, advertising completed FIAT reports to industry and issuing press releases to 
inform the public.  
Operation Paperclip has attracted by far the most public attention, both in terms of 
reactions at the time and in subsequent, popular exposes and academic histories of the 
hiring of Nazi scientists. Germany’s precipitous losses in logistical advantage manifested 
themselves in the second half of World War II, despite early multiple attempts to conquer 
the Soviet Union with Operation Barbarossa, the Siege of Leningrad, and the Battle of 
Stalingrad. One of the more noteworthy outcomes of the failed conquest was utter 
depletion of the German military-industrial complex and other resources. To combat this 
new threat, the German government began by early 1943 to recall from the front line a 
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number of scientists, engineers, and technicians. Those specialists returned to work in 
research and development to bolster German defense for a prolonged war with the Soviet 
Union (Braun, Ordway III, & Durant, 1985). Many, like Werner von Braun, were 
members of the Nazi Party and the SS and had worked in Germany's rocket development 
program. To re-establish their eligibility for scientific work, the Nazi government needed 
to ascertain their political and ideological reliability. Those who cleared the government 
check were placed on the so-called Osenberg List which came to include the crème de la 
crème of the German military science (Forman & Sanchez-Ron, 1996). 
Although it was by mere accident that the Osenberg List eventually reached the 
U.S. Secret Intelligence Service, it turned out to be one of the most prized possessions for 
the Research and Intelligence Branch of the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps as if the future 
of U.S. superiority in everything from chemical and biological warfare to its space 
program depended on gaining these German brains (McGovern, 1994). Small wonder, 
therefore, that following World War II, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) wasted 
little time to move about 1,500 other scientists, technicians, and engineers to the United 
States as part of Operation Paperclip. Since a sizeable portion of them were genocidal 
rocket-science geniuses and doctors who stood behind murderous medical experiments at 
concentration camps, the Central Intelligence Agency deliberately changed their 
identities to conceal any association with the heinous Nazi crimes. Their records as war 
criminals were classified for most of the twentieth century in order to prevent prosecution 
or extradition by foreign and domestic entities including the American Justice 
Department (Ordway & Sharpe, 1979).   
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As a result of Operation Paperclip, hundreds of former Nazi Germany 
technologists were officially put on the U.S. payroll. At present, it seems problematic to 
objectively assess the value-to-evil ratio of that well-executed campaign to boost 
American science and technology. It is highly doubtful, though, that without the influx of 
ex-Nazi brainpower, America would have had a much longer and more convoluted road 
to becoming the world's superpower that fully capitalized on the information obtained 
from the Germans related to major advances in science, military craft, and medicine. 
Successful efforts to seize not only German manpower and equipment but also 
information gave the United States hopes of gaining strategic advantage over the Soviet 
Union and taking the lead during the early years of the ensuing Cold War. The Soviets 
were not to be outdone, however, as the victors in World War II made ample use of 
Germany’s discoveries in science and technology in their own scientific, economic, and 
military spheres. When in 1943 the German leadership realized that there was little to no 
hope of winning the war with conventional weapons and started allocating the necessary 
funds and resources into the total war effort, time had been hopelessly lost. The Allies, 
spearheaded by the Soviet Union, bombed German laboratories, the territories under 
Germany’s control continued shrinking, and there was lack of coordination between 
scholars attached to various departments of the once immensely powerful scientific 
mechanism dating back to the 1930s.  
Overall, the impact of Nazi Germany was undeniably signiﬁcant for global 
progress in science and technology, particularly in the military sphere. As soon as the war 
was over, a number of German inventions, projects and developments were seized by the 
leading winning powers, first and foremost the United States and Great Britain, and to a 
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lesser extent, the Soviet Union. Wernher von Braun brought to the United States his 
records, plans, and speciﬁcations. His subsequent work in the American interests resulted 
in the appearance in this country of intercontinental ballistic missiles, cruise missiles of 
varying ranges, and ﬁnally, of the carrier rocket for man’s ﬂight to the Moon (Neufeld, 
2007). To his credit, von Braun channeled his engineering genius into a more peaceful 
and ultimately pro-American cause. He had dreamt of space travel and planned to 
constructing a manned space station that would function as a base for further space 
exploration and as a battle station and orbiting reconnaissance platform to achieve "space 
superiority" over the Soviet Union (Braun, 1953). 
In all fairness, it has to be said that the design of intercontinental ballistic missiles 
in the Soviet Union also started with a detailed study of the service forms and records and 
design features of V-l and V-2 missiles captured by the advancing Soviet troops in 
Germany, as did the creation of the carrier rocket for outer space later (O’Brien & Sears, 
2011). The entire set of engineering data on controlled nuclear reactors and the nuclear 
bomb was carefully removed from the German territory by the U.S. and British 
intelligence, and documents pertaining to controlled nuclear reactors landed in the hands 
of the Soviets. Thus, the development of science and technology, especially in the 
scientiﬁc and military spheres, by the two major Allied powers was to a considerable 
extent inﬂuenced in the post-war period by scientiﬁc discoveries, engineering and 
technological ideas and inventions of Nazi Germany. 
The large-scale proliferation of science and technology went hand-in-hand with 
the significant expansion of scientific and technical information (STI) produced by the 
burgeoning American, as well as Soviet, science. Handling of STI mirrored the extremes 
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of the two polar political doctrines themselves. Using a centralized system to gather, 
hold, and release STI gave the Soviets complete control over how their scientific 
documents were used. In addition, even the use of the Soviet library system worked for 
propaganda purposes against the United States and the Western bloc (Richards, 2001).  
 One of the major issues troubling experts of the day was the sheer mass of 
material being churned out in printed form. Some thought that the Soviets were better 
equipped to handle and make use of this data (Mackay, 1954) compared to the processing 
capabilities afforded by the siloed system in the United States. It was as if information 
was becoming too plentiful and therefore nearly unmanageable. The library system in 
particular was a target for such criticism, and it even became the topic of doom-and-
gloom writers (Toffler, 1970). The idea that STI would overwhelm the United States, 
while the Soviets had it covered efficiently was the root cause of the feeling of 
inadequacy in science and education that came to the forefront of the U.S. national 
agenda, particularly in the wake of the Sputnik launch in 1957. 
 The handling of STI during the Cold War was influential in terms of the 
formation of public opinion and governmental response to a different ideology. It was 
also reflective of a larger trans-Atlantic societal clash. While conflicts are usually 
associated with violence, and almost always with struggles, handling of information can 
also be viewed as a force that fueled the said conflict. Therefore, the following research 
questions and sub-questions will be considered through the lens of the conflict theory put 
forth by sociologist Lewis Coser. Incidentally, Coser’s conflict theory was developed 
concurrently with the Cold War. In fact, one of his major works was published in 1957, 
the year of the Sputnik launch, when American society felt a distinct pressure to mobilize 
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its intellectual capital in the face of an apparent scientific and technical information war 
with the Communist Soviet Union. 
1.4 Research Questions 
This dissertation focuses on issues of scientific and technical information 
management in the context of the Cold War. There exists an extensive and still growing 
body of literature analyzing the political, ideological, and various societal aspects of the 
confrontation. However, far fewer sources center on the outburst of STI and strategies to 
keep the growth of information in check during the heat of the Cold War. The purpose of 
the research is to narrow the gap in the existing knowledge through an investigation of 
the evolution of information crisis as a unique phenomenon of the mid-twentieth century.  
The main question posed in this study is: Why did the United States and the 
Soviet Union go separate ways in their quest to manage the information overload and 
achieve information dominance? What prompted them to choose completely different 
means to essentially the same end?  
In this study, information overload is presented as a viable concern recognized in 
twentieth century political and scholarly circles, as well as in society at large. As 
mathematician and philosopher of science Norbert Wiener pointed out, the motto of the 
post-war world was ‘to live effectively is to live with adequate information’ (Wiener, 
1948). More specifically, for Wiener modern life placed greater demands than any 
previous era on the process of exchanging information. In light of the escalating concerns 
that too much information could be just as dangerous as not enough, it is critical to 
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examine the efforts to control the communication of information, which became a major 
focus of both U.S. and Soviet Cold War policies and various STI management agencies.   
In order to answer the main question in this study, the work of the following 
agencies is examined:  
 National Science Foundation 
 National Technical Information Service 
 Atomic Energy Commission and, on the Soviet side,  
 VINITI, or the All-Union Institute for Scientific and Technical 
Information. 
  Additionally, to gain a more in-depth understanding of the issue under the 
investigation, a series of sub-questions are posed: 
1. What was the impact of the Cold War (delineated herein from 1945-1969) on 
information production in general, and specifically in relation to the scientific and 
technical areas? 
2. What was the effect of multiple independent departments and jurisdictions each 
dealing with their own specific concerns regarding information gathering, processing, 
storing, and utilizing in the Cold War era United States?  
3.        What was the effect of the highly centralized government on information 
gathering, processing, storing and utilizing in the Cold War era Soviet Union?    
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4. To what extent can the handling of STI during the Cold War era inform scientific 
and research data-handling processes in the digital age? 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
The enthusiastic emphasis placed on the production of scientific and technical 
information in the second half of the twentieth century has led to a crucial problem. A 
culture which so highly values information is inevitably going to face the problem of 
information excess. Since World War II, the fear of too much information has become 
one of society’s most significant, yet historically neglected, intellectual concerns. Those 
who have addressed this phenomenon from a contemporary perspective have nearly all 
argued that the information explosion represented a problem for society (Richmond, 
2003). Most frequently, such arguments revolve around the idea that the information 
explosion threatened the progress of science, the future of democracy, the existence of 
libraries, and human intellectual health. Indeed, many in government, science, and 
industry believed that the Soviet supremacy in science and technology represented the 
first falling domino in the demise of democracy.  
While there was a real increase in the production of information during the Cold 
War period, it would be erroneous to single it out as the sole threat to the futures of 
science, democracy, libraries, or human civilization itself. This research does not deny 
the  problem of information explosion that resulted from an apparent inability to control 
the publication of books, journals, and reports which emanated everywhere from 
scientific laboratories, industrial organizations, medical research, military intelligence, 
government hearings, legal cases, and humanistic scholarship. Instead, what this research 
does strive to accomplish is to depict information explosion as a relatively positive 
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phenomenon that caused immense growth in STI management capabilities developed in 
the aftermath of the Second World War by the United States and the Soviet Union.  
 Therefore, the historical phenomenological research described herein is 
untouched scholastic territory. It aspires to take a critical look at the past, at the time 
when the Soviet Union and the United States—two superpowers holding diametrically 
opposed views on how to organize human society at both the state and the international 
level—fought to establish their hegemony in the information realm as a means of 
advancing their political and social agendas. The intended result is to underscore how 
important it is to retrospectively analyze (and understand) the roots of the battle for 
information supremacy that transpired in the latter part of the twentieth century. 
1.6 Definition of Terms 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC): Established in 1946, this was a commission within 
the United States executive branch that placed control over the nuclear development that 
had led to the bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki into civilian hands. Along with its 
legacy as the agent of nuclear weaponry, however, the AEC played an important part in 
research, particularly ecologic and bio-environmental research near the Arctic (Mazuzan 
& Walker, 1985). The agency was abolished in 1974, under fire for lax environmental 
protections. It was succeeded by the Energy Research and Development Administration 
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Much of its purview is now subsumed under 
the mantle of the Department of Energy, spawned more out of concern about fossil fuel 
shortages than nuclear control, but created in 1977 by President Jimmy Carter and active 
to this day. 
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Cold War:  Technically the state of non-aggressive conflict that existed between the 
Communist bloc, headed by the USSR, and the democratic or Western bloc, headed by 
the United States, following World War II. Many designate the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989 and disintegration of the USSR into Russia and other nations as the end of the Cold 
War (LaFeber, 1991). For purposes of this research, however, due to its emphasis on 
scientific and technology information, the end will be considered 1969, when the United 
States succeeded in sending humans to the Moon, thus effectively ending the rush for 
technological superiority that had obsessed many Americans since the Soviet launch of 
Sputnik just over a decade earlier. 
Information Explosion: Proliferation of information available to the public that, for 
purposes of this study, began prior to World War II but rapidly accelerated during the 
Cold War period, prompting governments on both sides of that conflict to determine 
methods of dealing with the abundance of information as best suited their political and 
other agendas. 
National Science Foundation (NSF): Founded in 1950 as an outgrowth of the scientific 
movement that prevailed during World War II, this organization is a federal agency 
dedicated to the support of fundamental research and education in all scientific and 
engineering disciplines. Charged with making certain that the United States maintains 
leadership in scientific discovery and the development of new technologies, the NSF has 
over time provided funding for thousands of distinguished scientists and engineers to 
conduct groundbreaking research. 
National Technical Information Service (NTIS): This is a division within the Department 
of Commerce that contains federally funded reports collected in the fields of science, 
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technology, engineering, and related disciplines, made available to all users with 
additional search services offered for various subscription fees. 
Scientific and Technical Information (STI): Information developed in pursuit of science, 
technology or related fields in education and commerce.  
Sputnik: The first manmade satellite successfully launched by the Soviets into space from 
Earth in October 1957. Its unexpected success awakened concerns over scientific and 
technological inferiority on the part of Americans and was a major part in instigating the 
“Space Race” that defined the Cold War era competition between the Soviet Union and 
the United States. In fact, Sputnik not only caused alarm in Americans that they were 
behind the Soviets in progress, it also helped bring about major studies concerning the 
educational system and methods in the country, including the seminal “First-Grade 
Studies,” which examined reading instruction across the United States and paved the way 
for many educational reforms beyond the field of science and engineering (Graves & 
Dykstra, 1997). 
United States Information Agency: This agency was founded by President Eisenhower 
during the Korean War in 1953 to handle issues of public diplomacy in response, in part, 
to the activities of the U.S. National Security Council’s censorship efforts on library 
materials during the era of McCarthyism. 
VINITI: Centralized database run by the All-Soviet Institute for Scientific and Technical 
Information. This organization was formed in the 1950s to handle Soviet STI as a hard-
copy reference service. Soviet government policies were at the heart of VINITI activities 
and programs during the period under the investigation. 
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1.7 Conclusion 
 In the years following the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet 
Union experienced unprecedented industrial growth. Simultaneously, after World War II 
large files of documentation on military technology, especially rocket and radio 
engineering systems, were appropriated from occupied East Germany. The study of these 
materials gave powerful impetus to active information work in military industries. The 
demand for special information in various fields of science and industry intensified when 
programs to develop nuclear weapons, rocket technology, radar, and technical 
modernization of all military services were instituted in both the Soviet Union and the 
United States.  
These developments meant increase in the value of controlling information. This 
value was highlighted first by Hitler’s use of political propaganda paired with the 
successful militarization of German factories and emphasis on research during the war; 
second by the rise, following World War II, of a bi-polar global power structure. On one 
side was the Communist bloc, led by the Soviet Union, and with admitted plans of 
expansion and rigid unity of governmental control. In opposition was the Western or free-
world democracy-led bloc with the United States at the helm. 
 The next decades were to be overtaken by this rivalry—politically, economically, 
socially, and informationally. One of the most vivid contests between the two super-
powers involved science and technology. The alarmist attitudes toward the widening of 
the perceived technology gap became more intense when Americans faced the fact that in 
1957 the Soviets succeeded in launching a manmade satellite, Sputnik, into space. Thus, 
a need developed to control information as an outgrowth of the rivalry involving arms 
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and space. By the early 1950s, the Soviets instituted a centralized system called VINITI 
that was subject to strict government control.  
The United States, on the other hand, established several federal agencies, 
autonomous of one another, to deal with the growth STI: the National Science 
Foundation, the National Technical Information Service, and the Atomic Energy 
Commission, among others. In addition, in the United States there were numerous 
private, state, and local libraries, media outlets, and educational institutions dedicated to 
the production, preservation and promulgation of scientific and technical information.  
 This is a study of the diversity and complexity of approaches to managing the 
expanding body of STI in the post-World War II United States and Soviet Union, 
approaches that stemmed from intense intellectual and ideological rivalry between the 
two superpowers. This dissertation is divided into five chapters, including this 
introduction, that collectively intend to argue that the role of information management 
agencies in the development of large scale scientific and technological systems, most 
notably improvements to information infrastructure, can best be understood through an 
examination of their institutional history. The subsequent chapters are devoted to 
exploring the historical, rhetorical, political, and theoretical contexts in which the NSF, 
NTIS, AEC, and VINITI operated. 
 The attention in the following chapters is focused on the institutional history of 
the NSF, NTIS, AEC, and VINITI. This research investigates these organizations as 
political entities subject to stimuli and impulses of the political process. On the U.S. side, 
information management agencies found themselves dependent on congressional budget 
appropriations and at the same time enmeshed in a constellation of federal agencies with 
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both overlapping and conflicting interests. In the Soviet Union, VINITI represented the 
one massive centralized information service, and as such appeared to effectively abstract, 
translate, and disseminate the world’s information to communist scientists and engineers. 
Was one arrangement more effective than the other? The following chapters will attempt 
to investigate.
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 Few people understand the correlation between information handling, scientific 
advancement, and public opinion as clearly as those Americans who were made aware of 
the Soviet Union’s successful Sputnik launch in 1957. The pace of science and 
technology development accelerated even further following World War II, just as the 
Cold War era set in. The Cold War was a time of global polarization. On one side were 
the Communists, with the Soviet Union acting as the dominant player on the geopolitical 
scene in Eastern Europe. Although the Soviet Union and the United States had been allies 
during World War II, the Soviets upon signing of the truce formed a solid bloc with 
avowed expansionist goals. Opposed to them was the pro-democratic Western bloc, 
headed by the Americans and other members of the allied forces in the West. The two 
groups represented highly different approaches to political, economic and social 
structuring of society. The Soviet power had grown out of Marxian communist doctrine, 
which advocated strong centralized state control over means of production as a result of 
class conflict (Crossman, 2014). The West, on the other hand, historically favored laisse-
faire capitalism and democracy. 
 Although the two regimes were so drastically different, both were rooted in social 
conflict. The research herein continues to examine the impact of conflict, but in a non-
violent context, pertaining to control of information, specifically STI. Whoever controls 
information controls the destiny of the people is a thought expressed in many ways
 23 
 
 throughout history, including by the leaders of Nazi Germany that set the stage for war-
related scientific and technical outburst (Hitler, 1925). The manner in which information 
is controlled and released varies and can dramatically effect intra- and interstate relations. 
Prior to World War I, information was almost always conveyed in the printed 
form, with some exceptions: telegraph and to a lesser extent, telephone. In the United 
States, there were various sources and compilers of information. Many municipal, state 
and even federal repositories quickly sprung up, along with private collections and those 
affiliated with universities. Because of the plethora of institutions housing and handling 
documentation, one can assume that control over the process was all but nominal.  
 Overall, information was from an early age recognized within all forms of 
government as a tool of control and influence, but its success in a highly centralized, rigid 
or autocratic regime would seem far more likely than in a dispersed system with nominal 
freedom of the press and many libraries and other repositories of knowledge. Following 
World War I, Adolf Hitler displayed another example of a keen understanding of the 
power of information in political maneuvering. Hitler realized that information control 
was essential, and that it must be targeted at the less intellectual within society (and 
controlled by the government), since those with higher intelligence might not be easily 
swayed or may have already formulated their own opinions. His charisma, particularly 
with regard to speechmaking, underscored the veracity of his mostly unheeded intentions.  
When Nazis came into power, another important factor that Germany’s rulers 
realized was the need for scientific and technological knowledge, advancements, and 
armaments. Major factories were converted from commercial to military operations 
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without attracting much attention, and throughout the war German scientists dedicated 
countless hours and dubious methods to all forms of research (Wiesel, 2006). The near 
success of the Third Reich served as an inspiration for both sides battling in the Cold War 
to take seriously the development and handling of STI. In part this may explain why so 
many of the scientific research agencies and information gathering systems had their 
genesis less than a decade after the ending of the Second World War.   
2.1 The post-1945 Information Explosion Uncovered 
 The meaning of the post-1945 information explosion is quite literal. Following the 
dropping of the atomic bomb, scientific and technology research took off, producing 
volumes of valuable and strategically important documents. Information availability 
increased in other disciplines as well. The basic idea was that with progress came 
reporting about it, in unfathomable quantities. New resources were needed to keep up 
with this outpouring of documentation, and considerably varied methods were developed. 
While the Eastern bloc adopted a more centralized approach to managing its information 
centers, the Western way was fragmented and the government exerted considerably less 
control over release or slant of information. 
After World War II, the problem of information overabundance was viewed as a 
Cold War phenomenon. More importantly, in the context of the ideological confrontation, 
information as a new and valued commodity became another yardstick to be used to 
compare the developments in the United States with the Soviet Union. Despite the 
barriers presented by the Iron Curtain, the emergence of VINITI as a major scientific 
information management service did not go unnoticed in the United States.  Out of this 
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awareness, grew the information race that boiled down to which nation would devise the 
means to control the information in their possession, thereby ascertaining their superiority 
on the political and many other fronts.   
 Governments on both sides of the ideological spectrum had to confront this 
massive amount of documents. In the United State a belief grew in popularity that the 
ability to effectively manage the growth of information might be a crucial factor in 
winning the Cold War. This belief came largely from the intellectual circles as scientists 
and information gurus, such as James Perry and Allen Kent, acknowledged that effective 
utilization of recorded knowledge was rapidly becoming an area of intense competition 
between Americans and the Soviets (Perry, 1949; Perry & Kent, 1956). Allen Kent, who 
is widely considered a pioneer in the field of information science, noted that the 
magnitude of the Soviet information effort suggested the importance with which this 
problem is regarded by the Communists in their resolve to overtake and surpass the 
United States ideologically, scientifically, economically, and militarily (Kent, 1956).  
 The Sputnik launch in 1957 only served to intensify the belief that the secret to 
the Soviets apparent (and apparently growing) technological advantage over the United 
States was in the effective handling of scientific information by the former. Francis Bello 
(1960) further spoke to the increasing politicization of information as a social 
phenomenon when he attempted to muse about how to cope with information in his 
Fortune magazine article. Bello’s claim that the Soviets’ rapid progress in jet aircraft, 
rockets, electronics, and other areas might be traceable in substantial part to its effective 
retrieval of information was not without substance. 
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As the Cold War gained momentum, the phenomenon of information excess 
continued to be central to human existence. It should be noted, therefore, that it was never 
a one-time episode or an issue peculiar to a single domain of knowledge. On the contrary, 
as the above-mentioned American sources testify, it was an international phenomenon 
that was at the core of every intellectual endeavor in the years following the end of the 
Second World War. In fact, one is led to believe that the overabundance of information, 
especially in the remits of science and technology, was a generational problem affecting 
much of what transpired between the years 1945 to 1969. Kent (1977) characterized the 
situation back in the day as an information explosion or avalanche saying that the 
dramatic increase in the amount of information that was freely available post-World War 
II placed a burden on information centers, information retrieval services, government 
agencies, libraries, and business offices who were faced with an avalanche of recorded 
information unprecedented in the history of mankind.    
 The problem represented by too much information was neither solved in the 
generation after World War II nor did it fade away over time. Highly sensitive STI 
required careful handling in many cases, to protect or prevent the other side from getting 
ahead in the race, as many in the United States believed had occurred following the 
Sputnik launch (Graves & Dykstra, 1997). In fact, President Eisenhower‘s initial reaction 
to the satellite had been to downplay its significance, but intense media coverage quickly 
required further presidential action. In response, Eisenhower announced the creation of a 
new cabinet position: the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, appointing 
James Killian, who would simultaneously serve on PSAC, or the Presidential Science 
Advisory Committee (Killian, 1977).  
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 In a sense, the Cold War information overabundance signified a healthy 
competitive situation because the information race resulted in a considerable boost to 
American science. The launch of Sputnik in October 1957 brought all types of science 
back into the government fold, reminiscent the developments that had taken place during 
the Manhattan project (Frisch, 1970). Killian (1977) later reflected that ―while scientists 
possessed immense prestige in Washington during the years following World War II and 
historic actions were taken during the Truman administration to institutionalize science 
and technology in government, science had a uniquely close relationship to the 
presidency during Eisenhower‘s second term and extending into the Kennedy 
administration. The pivotal event was the public demonstration of Soviet achievements in 
space and rocket technology, embodied by Sputnik and potentially signifying a science 
gap afflicting the United States. That event led to the creation of an extensive federal 
science advisory apparatus, and a splurge in funding for research and development. 
 In many ways responsible for the Sputnik boom and further STI proliferation, the 
early PSAC scientists were largely academic physicists. Many had participated in the 
Manhattan Project or radar research during World War II. Therefore, they were especially 
patriotic, anti-communist, and idealistic, and thus happy to offer part-time or full-time 
government service while maintaining their academic positions. The PSAC scientists 
were enthusiastic about their new and expanded roles as government advisors because 
they considered national service and national security part of their obligation as scholars. 
 Thus, explosion in the amount of STI and the Soviet advancements were the 
underlying reasons for renewed appreciation of the expertise that scientists could bring to 
the government. One issue associated with the information explosion was the reality of 
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too much information being generated and it getting out of control. This idea, termed 
“information overload,” was coined by Alvin Toffler in his book Future Shock (Toffler, 
1970). The alarming side of this flood of information, particularly in terms of STI, 
according to Toffler, was that a super-industrial society would emerge that most human 
beings could not handle. People would become disassociated or isolated from one another 
and from their own humanity, in essence, as STI-generated programs would take over. 
Whether or not Toffler’s dire propositions that too much information may cause the 
downfall of humanity are even plausible, to date the major impact of information in the 
twentieth century has not yet been fully quantified.   
2.2 "Information" as a Central Phenomenon of the Cold War 
 There is no doubt that scientific research and material grew exponentially 
following the ending of World War II. With a polarized world, and each side attempting 
to devise mechanisms to potentially annihilate the other, various improvements in both 
lesser and advanced armaments, as well as scientific progress in general, were the order 
of the day (Kalenov, 2015). With this push for scientific and technological superiority 
came two major responsibilities: the need to disseminate scientific research and the need 
to store it (in a pre-computer age) (Kalenov, 2015). Prior to the access capabilities of the 
Internet, dissemination fell upon the shoulders of support units, as the scientists 
themselves were not capable of both creating and reporting their findings efficiently. 
Thus, scientific libraries became important in the handling of information, which became 
a phenomenon of perennial significance and power. Until after World War II, such 
libraries came to serve many vital purposes. They: 
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collected, stored, and made the necessary information available to scientists. The 
development of academic libraries worldwide, and specifically in Russia, was 
accompanied by the development of scientific infrastructure. Due to the rapid 
development of science in the 20th century, the rise of a strong network of 
scientific institutions and, as a result, an avalanche of scientific information, it 
became necessary to inform researchers about new scientific results that were 
obtained worldwide in their areas of research in a more targeted way. Many 
countries… established national and sector information centers that generated 
secondary information (Kalenov, 2015, p. 54). 
During the Cold War, information became the driving force in and of itself, 
almost an independent industry that supports or destroys those it impacts. However, in 
circumstances when nearly everything revolves around information the danger is that, if 
information becomes so important and humans become slaves to it, distortions, 
miscalculations and mismanagement are virtually inevitable. If one admits that 
information can control populations in the form of propaganda, one has to concede that 
that is managed information. If information becomes so overwhelming that it is no longer 
controllable, governments could sink under the weight of excessive documents that they 
are unable to process, much less use effectively. This is why a widespread perception of 
an information age was and is that it is one of the most important developments of the 
past twentieth century. 
The information crisis that emerged immediately after World War II is closely 
connected with the conflict at the core of the Cold War. Typically, an information crisis 
occurs when society’s informational needs are not met by the current system for 
delivering information. In the generation after the Second World War, the system of 
information transfer that included books, scholarly journal articles, abstracts, and 
conference presentations appeared to be breaking down because the sheer amount of 
information made its effective processing difficult. The spread of scientific and technical 
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information presented not only practical but also theoretical concerns. What emerged in 
the debate over the information explosion was a representation of a larger professional 
conflict between two groups. Humanists or literary intellectuals were at one pole and at 
the other were the scientists. Between them was a gap of mutual incomprehension, 
sometimes hostility and dislike, but most of all a lack of genuine understanding. 
 While humanists and scientists each promoted their own approach to solving the 
problem of the information crisis, participants from these groups barely worked together, 
and they frequently attacked each other from their distinctive professional poles. The 
scientific documentalists capitalized on this conflict by leaving librarians marginalized 
and, in the process, they improved their own professional status (Hahn & Buckland, 
1998). By linking the information crisis with winning the Cold War, the documentalists 
revived their profession, captured the leading role as information specialists away from 
librarians, established the computer as the central tool to manage the information 
explosion, and earned a tremendous amount of funding for their activities.  
The American political situation played an important part in exacerbating the 
perception of the threats posed by the East-West confrontation. Because Russian science 
structure was so drastically different from, and seemingly more advanced than, that in the 
Western Europe and the United States (Markusova, 2012), the Soviet state managed to 
create within the minds of Americans a number of insecurities regarding the state of their 
own science, technology, and education.  
Those alarmist attitudes left the U.S. intellectual elite vulnerable and contributed 
to the heightened perception of information crisis and the need to somehow keep it in 
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check. The most important component of this intellectual anxiety was related to 
information. Indeed, the Soviets appeared to be making great strides in the usage of 
scientific and technical information. In the Soviet Union, there were several agents of the 
central government, including libraries, which handled the information explosion. The 
managing role was assigned to the following national centers: the National Institute for 
Scientific and Technical Information (VINITI), which was thematically responsible for 
exact, natural, and technical sciences, the Institute of Scientific Information on Social 
Sciences (INION), which covered the social sciences, the All-Russian Research Institute 
for Health Information (VNIIMI), which specialized in processing of information in the 
health area, and other centers (Kalenov, 2015).  
VINITI was by far the dominant force behind scientific and technical information 
handling, along with the doctrines the central government directed at libraries through 
Bibliotekar publications (Richards, 2001). Microfiche, microfilm, newsreels, recordings, 
photographs, but mostly the printed word were the major types of information requiring 
at that time limited multidisciplinary management. Warehouses or libraries usually had 
adequate facilities necessary to house the vast quantities of materials being produced. 
Access was more difficult due to the fact that at the time information was in solid form, 
rather than accessible by computers. 
Incidentally, one of the major premises regarding information during the Cold 
War centers on the lack of coordination and cooperation between the two superpowers 
(Lubrano, 1981). It was, in fact, the United States that initiated the sharing resistance. 
Prior to that, the Soviets were, apparently, under the impression that sharing was possible 
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and mutually beneficial when it came to STI. The United States did not share this view 
due to the daunting effects of the Soviet science developments which culminated in the 
launch of Sputnik.  
Scientists and administrators abroad believed that their Soviet colleagues 
maintained a veil of secrecy over their research and used the satellite launch for 
geopolitical purposes. The foreign scientific community largely disregarded Soviet 
attempts to provide information about the satellite and to break through the isolationism 
of the Stalin years. Western scientists perceived the Soviet space program as competitive, 
secretive, and driven by Cold War diplomacy (Hughes, 1988). This pattern of missed and 
misread signals continued throughout the first fifteen years of the space age, and the 
perceptions of Western scientists have colored most Western historiography ever since.  
Sputnik, the knowledge of nuclear weapons, and the bits of information about 
VINITI were three key examples of their growing capability (Graham, 1998). 
Aggravating the situation was the fact that Soviet scientists published papers in the 
Russian language, a language that few American scientists could comprehend. This 
arguably added to an aura of secrecy and superiority that surrounded the Soviet 
endeavors. This Cold War anxiety was the central factor in spreading the awareness of 
the information crisis as it urged the Americans to invest even more efforts in scientific 
research and development. 
The Soviet advancements were pivotal for the evolution of the Cold War 
American science. David Kaiser (2006), however, attempted to demonstrate the primacy 
of scientists themselves in the creation of the scientific boom. Keiser (2006) wrote that 
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Sputnik had no automatic political valence because any technopolitical events are rarely 
capable of such impact. Rather, the determined lobbying by physicists and others 
transformed the launch of the satellite into a political event requiring a specific political 
response. The political response enriched scientists, particularly physicists, as it helped to 
drive an unprecedented explosion in physics enrollments in the United States, 
outstripping every other field in rates of growth (Kaiser, 2006). 
Surely, self-interest may have in part guided the lobbying efforts of scientists in 
the aftermath of Sputnik as they—and their research institutions— would benefit 
financially from the new policies and government investment. Nevertheless, for many 
Westerners the triptych of the Soviet scientific and informational prowess—Sputnik, 
VINITI, and successes in nuclear weapons research and development—raised genuine 
concerns about Cold War security and the state of American science (Herken, 1992). In 
all, the growing Soviet technological capability combined with the secrecy of their 
scientific achievements and their ability to manage the information explosion, created 
anxiety for both American scientists and American society during the initial stages of the 
Cold War. 
Information overabundance has often been used as an explanatory device for 
different contexts and cultural interpretations of various current information problems, 
but few studies have actively explored the history of the information excess in the context 
of agencies that were created worldwide (namely, in the United States and the Soviet 
Union) to combat the global information crisis. This research argues that this is why there 
has been a dearth of scholarship on such an important phenomena—the comparative 
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history of information management institutions—because few people have even believed 
that this problem has a history. This study attempts to reconsider the immediacy myth 
that treats information overload as a predominantly contemporary phenomenon by 
unveiling the details of the evolution of several key STI management organizations in the 
wake of the Second World War.   
2.3 Theoretical Framework 
 This research is based on the premise that two highly stratified sides were 
engaged in non-aggressive conflict over a period of years. The two sides, as mentioned 
earlier, were the Communist bloc led by the Soviet Union, and the Western or 
Democracy-oriented bloc led by the United States. Just as each side had different 
political, social and economic aims, each employed a dissimilar method of information 
management. This bifurcation in the management of information, especially STI, is the 
lens through which the Cold War era conflict is viewed in this research. Coser’s theory of 
conflict provides the theoretical basis to support this research. 
Coser’s Theory of Conflict 
Conflict theory has a long history in sociology. Karl Marx’ work in the early to 
mid-1800s formed the initial statements of this perspective. Marx was centrally 
concerned with class and the dialectics of capitalism. He argued that capitalism would 
produce its own gravediggers by creating the conditions under which class consciousness 
and a failing economy would come into existence (Darity Jr., 2008).  
 In the early twentieth century, Max Weber formulated a response to Marx’s 
theory. Weber saw that conflict did not overwhelmingly involve the economy, but that 
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the state and economy together set up conditions for conflict (Darity Jr., 2008). Of central 
importance to Weber’s scheme is the notion of legitimation. All systems of oppression 
must be legitimated in order to function. Thus, legitimation is one of the critical issues in 
the idea of conflict. Weber also saw that class was more complex than Marx initially 
supposed, and that there were other factors that contributed to social inequality, most 
notably status and party (or power). Since that time, a number of efforts have combined 
different elements from one or both of these theorists to understand conflict. 
In general, conflict theory seeks to scientifically explain the general contour of 
conflict in society: how conflict starts and varies, as well as the effects it brings. The 
central concerns of conflict theory are the unequal distribution of scarce resources and 
power. What these resources are might be different for each theorist, but conflict theorists 
usually work with Weber’s three systems of stratification: class, status, and power. 
Conflict theorists generally see power as the central feature of society rather than 
thinking of society as held together by collective agreement concerning a cohesive set of 
cultural standards, as functionalists do. Where power is located and who uses it are thus 
fundamental cornerstones of conflict theory. In this way of thinking, power is not 
necessarily bad:  it is a primary factor that guides society and social relations. 
Although Lewis Coser’s theory of conflict is by no means the most recent or most 
common used in academic research today, it is highly appropriate for this study for 
several reasons. First, Coser developed his theory while a doctoral candidate at the 
Columbia University precisely at the beginning of the Cold War era. A refugee from 
Europe to the United States, Coser was no stranger to the type of potential devastation 
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through change that could occur were either of the two superpowers to upset the 
equilibrium that existed at the time. Therefore, his theory bears authenticity due to its 
time of origin and the circumstances of its creator. 
 Even more fitting, however, is the basis and content of Coser’s theory of conflict 
that distinguishes it from most other similar sociological schools of thought. Coser chose 
as his major influence Georg Simmel (1904). As opposed to other prominent conflict 
theorists, such as Karl Marx, George Sorel or Max Weber, who viewed conflict as a class 
struggle involving coercion and power, with inevitable tearing down before reaching a 
period of equilibrium, Coser followed Simmel’s lead that conflict was a necessary 
component that could actually help maintain stability within social institutions. He 
explained this in terms of conflict creating agents to serve as “safety-valves” (Coser, 
1957, 202). Basically, if conflict arises within a society or between societies (which in 
most cases is an eventual certainty), certain institutions can manage and absorb the brunt 
of the conflict, allowing the discontent to feel that they have been heard and 
acknowledged without resorting to violence. In sociological or political terms this might 
be akin to either deterrence or appeasement. Nevertheless, the method by which the two 
Superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—managed information during the 
Cold War era reflects Coser’s theory in action. 
 On the one hand, Coser recognized the catalyst role of conflict in regards to 
science, technology, and information development in contexts where adaptation and 
flexibility in the face of conflict “prevents the ossification of the social system by 
exerting pressure for innovation and creativity (Coser, 1957, p. 197). Coser continued to 
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explain the positive impacts of conflict: “[c]onflict not only generates new norms, new 
institutions…it may be said to be stimulating directly in the economic and technological 
realm. Economic historians often have pointed out that much technological improvement 
has resulted from the conflict activity” of various institutions developed within free-
market or capitalist societies, such as unions in the 1900s (Coser, 1957, p. 198). Indeed, 
Coser basically tailored his conflict towards Western free-enterprise society. He 
contrasted the open society in the West with highly structured systems and concluded that 
“the emergence of invention and of technological change in modern Western society, 
with its institutionalization of science as an instrument for making and remaking the 
world, was made possible with the gradual emergence of a pluralistic and hence conflict-
charged structure of human relations” (Coser, 1957, p. 199).  
2.4 Conflict Theory in the Information Race 
 Thus, taking the Coser theory and applying it to the Cold War era is promising 
due to the distinction in societal freedoms which, Coser posits, enhance scientific and 
technological change, against the rigid dogmatism and centrality of the Soviet bloc, 
particularly in its treatment of STI. Internally, every system is bound to face challenges; 
if the government does not allow for adjustment based on a variety of needs, but sets out 
one rule to apply to all, conflict can encourage pronounced strain on that system. Coser’s 
theory supports the idea of conflict as force for strengthening structures, but only in a 
well-integrated society. According to Coser (1957), “a weakly integrated [society] must 
fear it” (p. 205).  
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This is why the dichotomy of information handling during the Cold War era is so 
amenable to Coserian analysis. The Soviet bloc was a rigid society, with little freedom of 
expression or choice such as those available in the opposing U.S.- led faction. This 
rigidity carried over into information handling, with the Soviets channeling and managing 
all their documents and information through one, state-controlled source (VINITI).  
The Cold War, rooted in the political and ideological conflict between the Eastern 
and the Western blocs, represented the time of global change. This confrontation divided 
the world between the two superpowers, resulted in a dramatic arms race, and led to 
numerous smaller but still violent conflicts around the world.  However, the Cold War 
was also a period of economic change around the globe, as nations aligned themselves 
with the engaged superpowers. New nations emerged as economic powerhouses or at 
least gained more relevance economically, and global interdependence became reality in 
an ever-shrinking market place. 
Given the duality of the Cold War impact, destructive on the one hand and 
change-provoking on the other, Lewis Coser’s theory of conflict seems to be the 
appropriate conceptual framework within which to analyze the issues of information 
control and management that plagued the world in the middle of the twentieth century. 
Coser’s is one of several schools of thought that have found their niche under the 
umbrella term “conflict theories.” These theories, as mentioned above, draw attention to 
power differentials, critique the broad socio-political system, and generally contrast 
historically dominant ideologies. In general, conflict theory maintains that in every type 
of social structure there are circumstances conducive to conflict, since individuals and 
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subgroups are likely to make occasional rival claims to scarce resources, prestige, or 
power positions.  
Although conflict theory is most commonly associated with Marxism, sociologist 
C. Wright Mills is considered the father of the modern iteration of conflict theory (Sim & 
Parker, 1997). In a nutshell, Mills' view is that social structures are created through 
conflict between people with differing interests and resources. Unequal distribution of 
power and resources, in turn, is what influences individuals in every society. Mills argues 
that the interests of the elite (such as the military-industrial complex) conflict with the 
interests of the common folk. At his most radical stance, Mills proclaims that the policies 
of the power elite tend to result in increased escalation of conflict, production of weapons 
of mass destruction, and possibly the annihilation of the human race.  
2.5 Application to the Current Study 
In the spirit of Mills’ research, Lewis Coser spearheaded the examination of 
previously neglected aspects of the theory concerning the functions of social conflict. 
Coser’s The Functions of Social Conflict (1957) was one of the best-selling sociological 
works of his time. Although not intended to reflect on the Cold War dynamics, the essay 
published at a time when the global geopolitical crisis nearly reached its climax laid the 
groundwork for our present-day understanding of the forces that propelled the social, 
political, and economic development of the two sides engaged in a massive battle of 
ideologies and worldviews. Coser postulated that conflict is inherently built into the 
functioning of society. In his analysis of conflict in terms of interactive processes, Coser 
went as far as to depict conflict as a form of socialization. Perceiving society as a 
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dynamic organism, Coser asserted that social groups were by their nature inharmonious. 
Somewhat paradoxically, Coser posited that if they (social groups) were harmonious, 
they would lack process and structure.  
Further, social processes under the conflict theory paradigm are the result of both 
association and dissociation, so that conflict eventually leads to cooperation, just as 
tears—the epitome of stress—eventually relieve physical pain and psychological tension. 
With tensions that are politically-driven, a similar scenario is in place. At first, conflict 
has a polarizing effect that accentuates the division between “us” and “them,” clarifying 
the factors that make each group distinct. This demarcation can be a hopeful sign of 
better things to come. In the words of Sharon Nepstad (2012), conflict with an out-group 
(external enemy) enhances identity and cohesiveness (the feeling of belonging) for the in-
group. Thus, a certain degree of conflict is an essential element in group formation 
because external threats build group solidarity as members—in this case, nations—unite 
to protect their common interests.  
The conflict theory also explains why the Cold War progressed—and ended—in a 
relatively peaceful fashion. In reference to factors that may exacerbate conflicts, Coser 
observed that conflicts tend to be more intense and destructive in close relationships than 
in distant ones. It is also part of human psychology to engage in long-term, drawn-out 
disputes that employ extreme tactics if people associate themselves with a bigger group 
fighting for a sacred cause. However, as everything else in life, both external and internal 
conflicts wane out over time, especially if one of the sides gains clear advantage and the 
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opposition is contained within the boundaries imposed by the victor to the extent that it is 
no longer a threat.  
Overall, the premise behind the conflict theory has valuable explanatory power 
for analyzing historical events. As the race for information superiority gained momentum 
in the context of the ideological dissention of the Cold War, the conflict theory situates 
information-specific problems, such as indexing and cataloging of technical reports, 
within the much wider range of issues pertaining to institutional rigidity, technical 
progress, productivity, and above all — evolutionary or revolutionary change of social 
system currently in place.  
Despite its seemingly destructive nature, conflict, in Coser’s interpretation, 
actually has considerable albeit latent functional consequences. What is important for this 
research is the idea put forth by Coser and his predecessors that conflict—of any type—
prevents stagnation in a social system by exerting pressure for change, innovation and 
creativity. This is why for each antagonist the conflict of the Cold War can be regarded as 
the catalyst in the economic, technological, and information production realm. The 
conflict theory in this case serves as a convenient springboard to the study of the volatile 
relationship between the capitalist West and the communist East, the relationship that is 
perhaps best reflected through the lens of their divergent scientific information 
management systems. 
2.6 Conclusion  
 Following World War II, the global political scene split into two major blocs, 
each controlled by a superpower: the Eastern bloc controlled by the Soviet Union and the 
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Western bloc controlled by the United States. Simply put, the two sides had different 
views of government role versus the individual, although both developed from conflicts. 
To explain the differences in ideology in very basic terms, one can posit the following: 
 The Americans have individual rights, personal freedom and opportunity based on 
capitalist principles. A capitalist economy is based on private ownership, profit 
and free competition. In the Soviet Union… no one profited from the labor of 
another and all profit was to be shared. These differences became a part of 
historical cultural and ideological gap that made it hard for the USA and the 
USSR to get along. (Hubpages, 2015). 
 
In reality the nuances were much greater, and divisions occurred along all lines, including 
STI management. This research focuses on the role of information, specifically scientific 
and technical information, in shaping the socio-economic and political developments of 
the Cold War era. 
 A pivotal event, the Soviet launch of the manmade Sputnik satellite in 1957 sets 
the tone for this analysis. This event caught Americans off-guard and immediately 
launched a separate concern: that the United States was lagging behind the Soviet Union 
in STI and specifically the Space Race. A number of information agencies and 
educational programs came into existence, and this very fact demonstrates the profound 
impact that the Soviet STI domain had on America during the Cold War era. Although 
many consider that era to extend until the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 or even the 
dismantling of the Soviet Union and freedom of Russia and the CIS in the early 1990s, 
for the purposes of this paper, the ending date is 1969, when Americans landed on the 
Moon. At this point the United States proved its superiority in STI and the Space Race. 
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 The United States set up several independently run government agencies with 
roles in STI handling—the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Science 
Foundation, and the National Technical Information Service, along with federal, state, 
and local libraries, private foundations, and academic institutions. The U.S. also 
supported libraries overseas, which were under more direct government control and 
tended to reflect government viewpoints more often than the independent organizations 
did. This correlates with VINITI, which was the centralized STI agency established by 
the Soviet Union. 
 The theoretical framework of the dissertation is based on Lewis Coser’s theory of 
conflict. Unlike many of his predecessors, including Karl Marx and Max Weber, who 
viewed conflict as an inevitable destructive force of change, Coser sided with Georg 
Simmel (1904) in concluding that conflict could have a stabilizing impact on society. 
This could occur under specific conditions, including latitude in expression and the lack 
of dictatorial control (in this case, control over information). 
Chapter Three, will discuss the choice of the methodology for this research. 
Chapter Four will include the results of the historical analysis of primary and secondary 
sources as well as findings from personal interviews, while the final chapter will be 
dedicated to conclusions, recommendations, and suggestions for further research.
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
In the academe, research can be understood as the continual search for truth using 
the scientific method, without the claim that the said truth can ever be fully discovered or 
confirmed. In more practical terms, Leedy and Ormrod (2010) define research as the 
process of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting documents in order to understand a 
phenomenon under the investigation. One may argue that its systematic nature is what 
distinguishes academic research from our daily information pursuits. The scholarly 
research process is much more structured in that a scholar is more often than not bound 
by certain frameworks and has to follow a set of previously established guidelines as he 
or she strives to define the purpose and the objective(s), collect and manage the data 
before finally communicating the findings to the rest of the world (Connaway & Powell, 
2010). This greater degree of prescriptiveness goes a long way toward facilitating 
discovery of elements of truth by helping one identify a research paradigm that further 
dictates the overall direction, as well as what needs to be included in the study, how  the 
study is to be done, and what types of inferences are probable based on the data collected.  
The specific choice of a research methodology and the overall approach largely 
depend on the nature of the study one plans to conduct and the question the study seeks to 
address. This dissertation research aims to examine the social, technological, political, 
and ideological issues that surrounded the emergence of scientific and technical
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 information (STI) systems in the post-World War II United States and Soviet Union. At 
the core of this research lies the exploration of the race for information superiority 
between the United States and the Soviet Union that transpired in the middle of the 
twentieth century. The overall intent of the researcher is to see how varying degrees of 
government centralization in the two countries impacted their respective approaches to 
scientific information management. The questions posed in the study are: Why did the 
United States and the Soviet Union go separate ways in their quest for information 
dominance? Were the means they chose to arrive at essentially the same end drastically 
different or were there similarities in their approaches?  
This study attempts to address these questions through a historical analysis of 
primary and secondary sources coupled with a series of face-to-face interviews with 
scholars whose expertise extends to the formative years of the U.S. and Soviet scientific 
and technical information domain. Consequently, what this research represents is a 
qualitative historical and cultural investigation of the STI management evolution, viewed 
through a number of information agencies that mushroomed in the mid-1940s-late 1950s 
to combat the post-World War II scientific and technical information overload.  
To a degree, this research is also a phenomenological study because it revolves 
around the phenomenon of the information explosion and its affects on the politics, 
society, and culture of the Cold War United States and the Soviet Union. It links 
information explosion to a political culture contextualized by the Cold War. The story 
this research aspires to unveil is about the intersection between human thought, or 
ideological history, and human action, or socio-political history (Nord, 1990). 
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3.1 Comparative Historical Analysis   
By definition, historical research deals with describing and explaining history, an 
ever-flowing stream of events and continuing changes in human life and a number of 
social, political, economic, and cultural institutions. Thus, historical research is 
undertaken in an attempt to discern patterns that tie all these events together. It is 
essentially a meaning-making exercise that aims not at the accumulation but at the 
interpretation of facts.  
The researcher acknowledges a critical distinction between merely conducting 
historical study and engaging in formalized research that is based on the historical 
method. Although both involve gathering information about major events and organizing 
the facts into a sequence, chronological or otherwise, this activity does not become 
methodologically-sound historical research until the act of interpretation comes into play. 
As Leedy and Ormrod (2010) assert, nothing can happen without it. It follows, then, that 
the task of the historian extends beyond describing what events happened and when. The 
historian is always intrinsically motivated to delve into the realm of why by unearthing 
and presenting a factually supported rationale for understanding an event, person, state, 
or even the whole historical era from a new vantage point.  
There has been a great deal of debate about whether to consider historical 
interpretive research as a truly scientific method (Mottier, 2005). It is often criticized for 
the lack of control the researcher has over the events gone by. Indeed, variables examined 
through historical research cannot be manipulated in any controlled fashion and there is 
hardly any certain way of knowing how these variables might have been influenced. 
While all of the above does hold true to some extent, one argument in defense of 
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historical research is that in the history domain, similarly to the physical sciences, cause 
and effect relationships do exist. Unlike physics or chemistry, though, history as a field of 
knowledge does not purport to exactify the nature of things. Nevertheless, it is hard to 
disagree with Pickard’s (2007) assessment that by reconstructing past events, the 
researcher’s task is to put together the pieces of the puzzle, add interpretation, and 
thereby contribute to the creation of new knowledge. The goal of such research is not to 
develop “the” answer, but an answer that is people, place, and time-specific. 
History is a ‘modest’ science because the focal point of the historical research 
method is to portray events, people, and agencies associated with them accurately and in 
a manner that facilitates empathic identification. Grounded in subjectivity, agency, and 
meaning, the epistemology of historical knowledge is narrational as it makes sense of the 
context within which the historical past comes to be known. O’Sullivan (2006) has 
rightfully suggested that one of the undeniable consequences of the non-deductive 
character of historical thinking is the possibility that different researchers may start from 
the same material and reach quite different conclusions that that are, given the available 
evidence, equally plausible. Lastly, historical analysis has been deemed particularly 
useful in obtaining knowledge of unexamined areas and in reexamining questions for 
which answers are not as definite as desired (Edson, 1998).  
How can the choice of the historical design propel the current research? In the 
case of document analysis, the logic is formed by establishing categories relating to the 
function of the document and the entity to which it is associated. Categorization of the 
data is an intuitional act which aims to form universal concepts, or truth. By intuitively 
examining combinations of the data, one forms a view of the whole. 
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 A few paragraphs earlier, the researcher referred to history as a modest science 
because its ambition is to offer but a possible interpretation of a period in the evolution of 
mankind and connect it to the present and the future. Historical research establishes this 
very important linkage by “systematically recaptur[ing] the complex nuances, the people, 
meanings, events, and even ideas of the past that have influenced and shaped the present" 
(Berg & Lune, 2012, p. 305). History is a very generous science as well because it allows 
for multiple voices to be heard and for multiples perspectives to be taken into account, 
especially with regards to the so-called landmark events that may have received a fair 
share of media, scholarly, and public attention. There are always stories that have yet to 
be told and subtleties that have yet to be considered.  
Take, for example, the race for socio-political and military supremacy that 
transpired in the context of the Cold War between the twentieth century United States and 
the Soviet Union. There are many distinguished scholars who have written at length 
about the Soviet economy in the mid-twentieth century. An even greater number of 
intellectuals have concerned themselves with the examination of the communist versus 
capitalist social order. The breadth and depth of coverage of the Cold War politics are 
impressive, too.  
It is obvious that the rivalry manifested itself in the information domain as well. 
There is a realization in the literature that the rapid expansion of scientific and technical 
advances across the world and the subsequent spread of modern technologies was the 
root cause of the unprecedented growth of the overall amount of documents, particularly 
scientific and technical information (Gaddis, 1983). In the United States and the Soviet 
Union, this growth spurred a heated cross-continental rivalry that lasted nearly five 
 49 
 
decades. In the post-War United States, a number of federal establishments attempted to 
develop their own strategies of keeping the information overload in check. Such 
increased attention resulted in the steady government support of research and 
development related to information problems and solutions.  
Despite an almost parallel course of development in the Soviet Union, little is 
actually confirmed about the influence of the Soviet experience on the development of 
American scientific and technical information and the institutions that were charged with 
its management. In actuality, did the influence go both ways?  
As any historical research, this study deals with the major issues of why and how. 
Why did the United States and the Soviet Union go different ways in their quest for 
information dominance? How did it come down to the dichotomy of the rigid, tightly-
controlled, and monolithic system of STI management on the Soviet side and a vast array 
of siloed agencies each of which dealt with its own area of focus that Americans 
developed over time? A familiar challenge for every historian is the paucity of 
interpretive scholarship, which in the case under the investigation is due in part to 
information isolation and meager numbers of original sources, the majority of which have 
been published in the Russian language to never be translated into English.  
This study utilizes two methods of data collection: secondary source analysis and 
interviews. The interviews will, arguably, be the more important aspect of the data 
collection because this research seeks to uncover individual perceptions of a phenomenon 
(information overload) and the perceived influence of one system of STI management on 
the other. However, the two methods combined add breadth to the study by discovering 
another dimension and giving a counterpoint to the interpretation of the interviews. The 
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study of any political era or a sequence of social events benefits from the presence of 
multiple vantage points. Fielding and Fielding (1986) said that “the essence of the 
triangulation rationale is the fallibility of any single measure as a representation of social 
phenomena” (p. 29). Thus, the goal of utilizing multiple methods is to demonstrate 
validity through the process of triangulation and to add breadth to the findings. 
A triangulated method of data collection has been described as a means to 
enhancing the validity of the data (Olsen, 2010). It often involves two or more 
instruments of data collection (in this case historical analysis and interviews that were 
used to validate the findings from secondary sources). Using more than one instrument or 
source enables a researcher to use the strengths of an instrument to compensate for the 
strength of the other (Olsen, 2010), which, in turn, also increases the accuracy of a 
research study. 
At the same time, Patton (2002) observes that while the goal of triangulation is to 
demonstrate validity of the findings, triangulation does not always point towards the 
same answers. When multiple methods are used, different data sets may emerge. There 
are certainly inherent biases in any research, but by triangulating the data and using 
multiple types of evidence, claims can be constructed which are grounded in evidence. 
3.2 Qualitative Research Design: Relevance for the Current Study 
The interview (a qualitative research method) participants were selected on the 
basis of their exposure to VINITI and the degree of involvement with their Soviet 
counterparts. When discussing qualitative design types, John Creswell (2013), renowned 
for his expertise in research design and methodology, emphasized the role of the 
researcher who applies his or her personal perspective to investigating social phenomena. 
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Unlike its statistics-driven counterpart, qualitative research revolves around collecting 
primarily textual data whose purpose is to describe, explain, and contextualize 
phenomena rather than establish direct cause and effect relationships between variables.  
Locke & Golden-Biddle (1997) have stated that the socially constructed view of 
science suggests that “knowledge cannot be known separately from the knower, because 
the content of knowledge is influenced by social practices and interactions, and because 
the determination of what ideas count as knowledge is a meaning-making activity enacted 
in particular communities” (p. 1025).  According to Moustakas (1994), the commonalities 
of qualitative research include the following: 
 The wholeness of human experience include personal behavior and 
knowledge; 
 Qualitative researchers seek to understand the meanings and value of 
experience; 
 The methods of qualitative research may include formal or informal 
interviews where participants describe their experience verbally or in writing.   
The commonalities of qualitative research that Moustakas (1994) highlighted are 
relevant to the nature of this study. The human experience that the interview participants 
have had and the value of such experience are at the center of this study.  Therefore, this 
study looks into addressing these commonalities and ensuring that the intended objectives 
are achieved. 
 Qualitative research embodies numerous tools and methods. Among the most 
common are phenomenological means, by which participants in a given study reveal 
impressions or concepts about a phenomenon that they have experienced. This can be 
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done through surveys, interviews, or narrative reports. In fact, this study contains inherent 
and specific reasons for selecting qualitative research design over other alternatives. One 
of the most important advantages of this design is that data are based on the participants’ 
own categories of meanings; (Creswell, 2013). With a qualitative research design, a 
researcher is able to understand and describe individuals’ personal experience of the 
phenomenon under study while exploring the phenomenon within its natural environment 
(Creswell, 2013). Besides, the researcher gets to utilize dynamic approaches during a 
research process. Most importantly, a qualitative research design yields more detailed 
data, which other research designs cannot guarantee (Creswell, 2013). 
 It is easy to understand how qualitative methods involve bias, as analysis and 
opinion of the interviewer (or document examiner) and the interviewee (or documents) 
reflect or hold information that is selectively chosen for presentation. Interestingly, one 
form of qualitative design that eliminates, to the extent possible, researcher bias is 
transcendental phenomenology (Husserl, 1931). This is an unusual qualitative 
methodology that has influenced content analysis of data tremendously. Most 
phenomenological research is based on narrative or tool-aided information gathering and 
then theme or content analysis, and is therefore subjective. Given the nature of this study, 
a certain degree of subjectivity is inherent in data analysis. 
3.3 The Interview Protocol 
 Interviews take more time than do questionnaires to administer and also allow for 
follow-up and detailed explanations. Therefore, the group to be interviewed for this study 
was rather small compared to the vast amount of other materials that were considered. 
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The interviewees included four prominent scholars and information specialists whose 
research and professional practice has dealt with some, or all, information management 
agencies under the investigation. 
The following open-ended interview questions were asked: 
 Could you tell me about your experience, if any, in the Soviet Union and the 
growth of their scientific and technical information management system during 
the Cold War era (1945-1969)? 
 What was your impression of their influence, if any, on the U.S. counterparts? 
Did the influence go both ways? 
 Which of the U.S. information management agencies, if any, did the Soviet 
VINITI impact the most and why, in your opinion? 
 How would you assess the impact of VINITI on developing countries? Was it any 
different from the influence on the U.S. information agencies? Why? 
 How would you describe the relationship between the two superpowers, the US 
and Soviet Union, in terms of their struggle for information superiority? Was it a 
relationship of mutual respect and recognition of each other’s strengths, or 
perhaps fear, or despise? 
 There is an opinion in scholarly circles that the influence actually went the other 
way around and every innovative approach or technique the Soviets did or came 
up with in the 1950s-70s—the Americans already has in place some twenty or 
thirty years ago. Would you agree or disagree with this view? Why? 
Face-to-face interviews are somewhat spontaneous events that can lead in the 
direction of the interviewee’s expertise. For this reason, the questions and probes were 
open-ended and could be followed up with more specific inquiries depending upon the 
experience of the interviewee and what he or she can add to address.  The standardized 
open-ended interview, the method employed y this research, is more structured in terms 
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of the wording of the questions. Participants are asked identical questions, but the 
questions are worded so that responses are open-ended (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2003). This 
open-endedness allows the participants to contribute as much detailed information as they 
desire and it also allows the researcher to ask probing questions as a means of follow-up. 
 Personal interviews allow for reading of the body language and additional 
interaction. In addition, the same questions were used in either case to preserve the 
consistency of results. The sample should be adequate for this particular study; according 
to methodologists such as Polkinghorne (1989) and Leedy & Ormrod (2010), an 
interview pool or sample consisting of participants numbering from five to twenty-five is 
usually considered sufficiently reliable if the individuals have direct experience that they 
can recall and articulate. Although only four interviewees were identified, they are 
eminently qualified as they possess significant knowledge of the topic of information 
processing and use during the Cold War era. Experts in this area, such as Moustakas 
(1994) and Polkinghorne (1989), have produced a four-step procedure, similar to that 
developed by Creswell (2013) for narrative research and reproduced below: 
1. Interviewer preparation, including developing a frame of mind conducive to 
receiving information that supports or undermines one’s proposals and that puts 
the interviewees at ease.  
2. The data collection phase that requires contact with a sample population 
experienced with the phenomenon. Although this sample should be statistically 
significant, it should not be overwhelming, to insure that quantity does not 
compromise quality.   
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3. Data analysis. 
4. Finally, the researcher produces both a textural description of the experiences 
and structural description of experiences reported. By developing these, the 
researcher can arrive at the underlying themes and apply them to the theoretical 
construct. In this study, data analysis was performed by historic analysis 
(particularly of secondary sources but also of interview results), combined to 
some extent with thematic processing. 
3.4 Justification of Methods 
 Because it would be erroneous to expect completely unequivocal answers to any 
of the questions posed in the proposed study, it falls within the realm of qualitative 
methodology, further subcategorized as comparative historical analysis. In particular, this 
investigation involves a chronological analysis of primary and secondary documents 
coupled with a series of face-to-face interviews with U.S. and Russian scholars whose 
expertise extends to the formative years of the United States and Soviet scientific and 
technical information domain. The interviews were conducted to help obtain descriptive, 
in-depth data on unique perspectives and individual opinions inaccessible through other 
data gathering means. The interviews, allowing the subjects to respond on their own 
terms and within their own linguistic parameters, also served to offer a great way to 
clarify meaning and shared understanding. 
Comparative historical analysis is usually associated with social sciences, as 
opposed to quantitative analyses which are the mainstay of empirical, scientific research. 
One of the key points for history scholars is that they try to explain issues that have been 
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disputed “over divergent theoretical frameworks, for which the tension between 
structuralism and culturalism [and this writer would add functionalism] is a major 
example. And there are still unresolved epistemological issues that arise from the attempt 
to do justice to historical particularity and at the same time achieve theoretical 
generalization” (Mahoney & Reuschmeyer, 2006, 5). 
 Comparative historical analysis is an optimal method to perform causal analysis, 
such as that laid out by the theoretical framework of Coser’s theory of conflict combined 
with the examination of events and expert opinions in the field of STI. This is the 
appropriate choice of the methodological approach because the present study is 
concerned with the development of STI management institutions over time and with the 
use of systematic and contextualized comparison (Mahoney & Reuschmeyer, 2006, 6). 
Consistent with over qualitative methods, historical analysis brings together historical 
evidence through methodological tools that have developed over the decades. There is a 
specifically delineated time period—the Cold War era from its beginnings until 1969, 
when the U.S. “won” the Space Race by landing humans on the Moon. There are cases 
that are sufficiently similar to be meaningfully compared—the U.S. information 
management system regarding STI that is decentralized versus VINITI, a rigidly 
controlled arm of the Soviet scientific and technological machine. 
 Scholars of history become intimately familiar with their subject, as they must 
research original and secondary sources from specific time periods and within specific 
topics. There continues to be a paradigm debate over whether or not historical research is 
sufficiently original or if it merely supplements the initial conclusions of others. 
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Interestingly, some comparative historical research has answered this charge by 
combining qualitative and quantitative methods (Mahoney & Reuschmeyer, 2006). Such 
an approach is not necessary in this study, however, because much of the research is new 
and until now has been unavailable to the West as many documents written in Russian 
have not been previously translated or otherwise scrutinized. Thus, the current study 
touches uncharted territory and need not rely on an excessive mixture of methods for 
legitimization. It does, of course, combine interviews with archival research, so in that 
sense it constitutes a hybrid within qualitative research methodology. 
Importantly enough, qualitative research builds on inductive reasoning that 
derives general principles from specific observations or sources and their interpretation. 
Inductive reasoning is inherently uncertain because the conclusions it affords are always 
those of a personal nature as examination in qualitative research is done through the eyes 
of the researcher. It does not have rigorous, time-proven instruments or theories to fall 
back on. Rather, the researcher him/herself is in charge of carving out the data collection 
and analysis processes. Dry numbers are out of the equation; and in their stead the scholar 
undeterred by the nuances of the qualitative methodology weaves feelings, conjectures, 
and at times downright speculation into the fabric of a coherent argument. The beauty of 
qualitative research is that it is never finite. Conclusions drawn through inductive 
reasoning are always open to question since by definition the conclusion is a bigger deal 
than the evidence on which it is based. Simply put, qualitative studies hold untapped 
potential for further inquiry because it is simply beyond the power of the human mind to 
put the boundaries on how social, cultural, political, or historical phenomena can be 
explained in light of past or emerging evidence (Magilvy & Thomas, 2009). 
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3.5 Conclusion  
 This research is conducted within the broad framework of qualitative design. 
Although great consideration has been given to the benefits of quantitative or mixed-
methods research, two aspects of qualitative methodology are optimal for this study. 
First, the researcher located four experts in the field of STI with much experience among 
them, particularly involving VINITI, the powerful Soviet information management 
agency. All four individuals agreed to in-person interviews with the researcher.  
 The second form of qualitative research to be utilized herein is the comparative 
historical chronological method. Two diverse systems of STI handling are being 
compared to ascertain if there is any causal relationship between their structures. A 
specific time period of the Cold War era, from the end of World War II until 1969, 
provides the chronological time frame. Finally, the interpretation of a polarized world 
with the information explosion phenomenon in a pre-Internet setting and scientific and 
technology research progressing at a mind-boggling speed provides the context. This area 
has had little definitive research accomplished about it in the past, so this work should 
enlighten many, in particular since some of the documents are available only in Russian 
and hence have not enjoyed much scrutiny in the West. 
 What the researcher hopes to achieve overall is an improved understanding of 
today’s global effort to continue mastering the art of information management and reduce 
what author David Shenk (1997) has defined as “data smog.” The historical perspective is 
instrumental in this regard because the problems we are encountering now—massive data 
outputs and the need to manage them for the betterment of humanity—are conceptually 
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quite similar to the issues the information world encountered some seventy years ago. 
Therefore, this study argues, continued research on the work of the pioneers of 
contemporary information management has a distinct future outlook.
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS 
The history of organizations established to manage scientific and technological 
information in the United States and in the Soviet Union is critical for addressing the 
question of why the United States and the Soviet Union undertook such different paths to 
manage information overload and attempt to achieve information dominance during the 
Cold War period – the central research question of this study. As mentioned previously, 
among the key organizations in the United States for the management of scientific and 
technical information were the National Science Foundation, the National Technical 
Information Service, and the Atomic Energy Commission. The Soviet Union, conversely, 
had VINITI, or the All-Union Institute for Scientific and Technical Information. This 
chapter presents the history of these various agencies and considers how their 
organization and their operational practices affected the management of information and 
the potential for information dominance; the strengths and weaknesses of these 
organizations and their relationships and contributions to the intelligence communities in 
the United States and the Soviet Union.  
4.1. Scientific and Technical Information in the United States 
The organization of information in the United States during the Cold War period 
was represented largely by the operation of such agencies as the National Science
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Foundation, the National Technical Information Service, and the Atomic Energy 
Commission, with specialization as the driving force of the American information matrix.  
Indeed, specialization, particularly as it was related to electronic sorting of journal 
abstracts, became one of the most obvious means of coping with the rising flood of 
literature (Price, 1961). Price also wrote about the growth of information as a primary 
issue of the twentieth century. He suggested that science was expanding at such a rapid 
rate that it was effectively doubling both in terms of publication and manpower in a ten to 
fifteen-year period following the Second World War (Price, 1961), fitting into part of a 
much broader trajectory, going back to the seventeenth century, the time that also saw a 
major explosion of science.   
The translation of this idea into the context of Cold War information management 
may not be obvious but it provides a segue toward understanding that the way that the 
United States sought to manage information and the way that the Soviet Union managed 
information was very different. The Soviet Union sought, primarily, to generalize, 
although their generalization was not an emphasis upon general skills. As has been 
already discussed in the preceding chapters, the Soviet Union created a centralized STI 
management structure that was epitomized by VINITI. All disciplines of science were 
managed through the Institute. On the other hand, the United States tended to approach 
information management with much more emphasis on specialization. Different 
organizations were responsible for managing information about scientific advancements 
in their respective fields.  
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National Science Foundation 
The National Science Foundation is recognized as a key organization in the 
management of information in the United States, to the extent that it is widely credited as 
instrumental in the development of the Internet during the 1980s with the construction of 
the Supercomputer Center Program. In a summary of the organization’s history, 
Gonzalez (2014) discusses how the NSF was founded to support both basic research and 
education in the non-medical sciences and engineering. Congress established the 
foundation as an independent federal agency in 1950 and directed it to promote the 
progress of science; to advance the national health, prosperity, and welfare; to secure the 
national defense; and for other purposes. The NSF quickly established itself as a primary 
source of federal support for U.S. university research, especially in certain fields such as 
mathematics and computer science. The agency also became responsible for significant 
shares of the federal science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 
education program portfolio and federal STEM student aid and support (NSF Annual 
Report, 1955; 1956).  
Gonzales (2014) notes that the NSF was established as an independent federal 
agency, meaning that, although it was technically controlled by a budget and oversight 
process, it had a relatively large amount of autonomy as an institution compared to many 
other federal agencies. The U.S. government did not have as much direct involvement in 
its operations so as to have a substantial impact. This autonomy was what might have 
allowed NSF to stay consistent with the scientific mission of the organization, too, 
indicating that it might have something to do with the goal of acquiring knowledge or 
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managing knowledge. The Federal government did not view this largely societal goal as 
something that necessarily needed to be tightly controlled as other missions associated 
with Federal agencies would perhaps demand. An alternative perspective is that the 
independence of the organization is connected to the tension concerning public values 
and accountability as a key issue.  
In addition to its research responsibilities, which were primary, the NSF was also 
understood to be the only federal agency whose main mission involved education across 
the various fields of science and engineering, establishing a dual involvement in 
education and research in STEM areas. Virtually from its very inception, the NSF was 
under considerable pressure to be responsive to both the President and Congress on one 
side and the scientific community on the other. This pressure was compounded by the 
necessity of the NSF to walk a narrow path in seeking out and claiming its spot under the 
Sun that would solidify its position in the federal apparatus, without stepping on the toes 
of the well-connected mission agencies or alienating its supporters. 
In the early 1950s, the organization saw the need to expand its constituent base 
both inside of the federal government and the scientific community. To do so, the NSF 
focused its attention on several areas that were to become mainstays of Foundation policy 
over the years – namely, grants to fund basic research, investment in scientific equipment 
and facilities, and perhaps most importantly scientific manpower. However, the NSF 
development did not go without challenges, not the least of which was the geopolitical 
environment of the time. In the heat of the combat that transpired on the Korean 
Peninsula, William T. Golden, special consultant to President Truman on mobilizing the 
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nation's scientific resources, recounted a conversation with Vannevar Bush in which both 
agreed that during military mobilization in Korea NSF appropriations should be reduced 
well below the proposed $10 million budget, with Bush suggesting a meager 
appropriation of $200,000 (Golden, 1950).  
In his December 6, 1950 memo, Golden observed that “The National Science 
Foundation should not be given funds or otherwise encouraged to compete with these 
programmatic military agencies in the quest for scientific talent etc.-- certainly not at this 
time since the National Science Foundation is supposed to support only basic and non-
military scientific research and development (Golden, 1950). Nevertheless, Bush 
anticipated the basic research programs of other federal agencies, specifically mentioning 
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), would be turned over to the NSF once it was 
operational and the “Budget boys [Bureau of the Budget]” had determined funding levels 
across the federal science apparatus.  
In its unique position, the NSF growth was in line with the general developments 
of the information age. Carroll, Jack, and Cotter (1990) produced an extensive study on 
that era. They explored how the information age came about and how the world became 
“overloaded with data” (p. 3). They open their work by summarizing a range of studies 
that give an impression of how the information age emerged and what, in a way, it looked 
like. They describe that studies typically demonstrate that scientists “spend more time 
handling research results than conducting new research. Categorically, this observation 
demonstrates the significance of the ensuing information age and the relevance of 
studying it: aerospace scientists and engineers found that they spent about thirty-five 
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percent of the work week communicating technical information and about thirty-one 
percent of the work week dealing with “technical information received from others” (p. 
3). Both tasks taking up roughly sixty-six percent of the work week dealt with the 
phenomenon of information management.  
Their research also puts together a vivid picture of the variety of organizations 
that operated in the United States to support information management. They consider the 
information infrastructure and note that the needs and information-seeking behavior of 
scientists, engineers, managers, and policy makers were all different, creating the 
contextual goal of information management. They also outline how systems developed to 
capture information in the research and development (R&D) process, using the term 
“stage” to delineate chronological steps from the first steps in the R&D process, the 
development of the research proposal, and all the way through to the final steps, the 
publication of final results.  
Carroll, Jack, and Cotter (1990) concentrate on the major scientific and technical 
information repositories of the three major federal agency members in the subfields of 
energy, space, and defense-related information:  
 The Department of Defense (DOE) is noted as having technical report databases 
with 1.5 million records at the time of publication, with the beginning date of the 
organization noted as 1953. 
 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is noted as having 
an STI database and 2.4 million records, with the beginning date of 1962.  
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 The National Technical Information Service, the NTIS, is identified as the NTIS 
Bibliographic Database, with 1.5 million records and a beginning date of 1964.  
In compiling this information, Carroll, Jack, and Cotter (1990) underscore the fact 
that these databases were launched on the basis of CENDI (Commerce, Energy, NASA, 
Defense Information Managers Group), an interagency group of senior Scientific and 
Technical Information (STI) managers from fourteen different United States federal 
agencies. The resources of these CENDI databases were the result of massive information 
production spurt that, one way or another, took the form of publication, accompanied by 
millions of dollars of R&D investment.  
As a result, bibliographical systems began to emerge that featured information 
architecture to support national and international global change. Reviewing global change 
information, they note, too, that, dealing with major interdisciplinary and intermission 
problems complicated the collaboration between various agencies and numerous 
obstacles had to be overcome so that scientists could see and solve purely technical 
problems. Their observation is also that the historical information of information 
infrastructure, STI management, R&D management, and policy management have not 
been “closely coupled”, although today, the U.S. government is noted to spend billions of 
dollars per year on STI systems, with four percent of every research dollar spent on 
information organization that supports R&D (Carroll, Jack, and Cotter, p. 12).  
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 illustrate the steady growth of Federal research and 
development expenditures as a percentage of the U.S. Budget between 1940 and 1969, 
the time period representing the primary focus of this study (Maddrell, 2013): 
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Table 4.1 Federal Research and Development Expenditures as a Percentage of the U.S. 
Budget, 1940-60, millions of dollars 
 
Fiscal Year 
 
Total 
Budget 
Outlays 
 
R&D 
Expenditures 
 
% of 
Budget 
Spent on 
R&D 
    
1940 9,589 74 0.8 
1945 95,184 1,591 1.7 
1950 43,147 1,083 2.5 
1955 68,509 3,308 4.8 
1960 92,223 7,744 8.4 
 
As becomes evident from Table 4.1 above, the Second World War acted as a 
major catalyst for drastic increases of the percentage of the U.S. Federal budget allocated 
for research and development expenditures during and immediately following the war. It 
is hardly surprising that the largest increase occurred between the years 1940 and 1945. 
Federal budgetary allocations for research and development more than doubled in the 
five-year period as the government was investing heavily in the war effort. Predictably, 
as the space race was heating up, the second largest increase in funding allocated in the 
U.S. for research and development was registered between the years 1955 and 1960 in 
response to the Soviets’ launching of Sputnik in October 1957. Table 4.2 below provides 
a more detailed account of the U.S. R&D budgetary allocations dynamic through the end 
of 1969, the year of the U.S. astronauts’ landing on the Moon that, in essence, reaffirmed 
the U.S. decisive advantage in the space race. According to Table 4.2, U.S. budgetary 
allocations for research and development continued to grow, albeit on a lesser scale, 
throughout the 1960 and remained consistently high in the latter half of the decade.   
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Table 4.2 Federal Research and Development Expenditures as a Percentage of the U.S. 
Budget, 1950-69, millions of dollars 
 
Fiscal Year 
 
Total 
Budget 
Outlays 
 
R&D 
Expenditures 
 
% of 
Budget 
Spent on 
R&D 
    
1950 43,147 1,083 2.5 
1951 45,797 1,301 2.8 
1952 67,962 1,816 2.7 
1953 76,769 3,101 4.0 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
70,890 
68,509 
70,460 
76,741 
82,575 
92,104 
92,223 
97,795 
106,813 
111,311 
118,584 
118,430 
134,652 
158,254 
178,833 
184,548 
3,148 
3,308 
3,446 
4,462 
4,991 
5,806 
7,744 
9,287 
10,387 
12,012 
14,707 
14,889 
16,018 
16,859 
17,049 
16,348 
4.4 
4.8 
4.9 
5.8 
6.0 
6.3 
8.4 
9.5 
9.7 
10.8 
12.4 
12.6 
11.9 
10.7 
9.5 
8.9 
 
National Technical Information Service 
Recognized today as the largest central resource for government-funded scientific, 
technical, engineering, and business related information, the National Technical 
Information Service (NTIS) organization was established more than sixty years ago, with 
the purpose of providing support for businesses, universities, and, consistent with STI, 
managing the provision of public access to roughly three million publications covering 
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over three hundred subject areas (NTIS). The precursor to the NTIS was the Office of the 
Publication Board, an agency created by President Harry S. Truman during World War II 
to collect, review and transmit to the public formerly classified technical information. In 
1950, Congress passed the Technological, Scientific and Engineering Information Act, 
instructing the commerce secretary to establish a repository for technical information 
from whatever sources, foreign and domestic, that may be available,” and to make “the 
results of technological research and development readily available to industry and 
business, and to the general public. The Office of the Publication Board became the 
Office of Technical Services, which in turn became the Clearinghouse for Federal 
Scientific and Technical Information. Finally, an act of Congress established the NTIS on 
September 2, 1970. 
Over the next two decades, there have been occasional grumblings about the 
NTIS’ future. Some have asserted that there isn’t sufficient oversight on the agency, 
while others say the NTIS faces insurmountable competition from private-sector 
information sources, the Internet and even other government agencies. Still others say the 
way the NTIS functions is inefficient and unfocused—an apparent reflection of the 
organizational legacy of its incarnations prior to 1970.  
The mission of the organization today is recognized as promoting “American 
innovation and economic growth by collecting and disseminating scientific, technical and 
engineering information to the public and industry, by providing information 
management solutions to other federal agencies, and by doing all without appropriated 
funding” (NTIS, 2015). Although the structure of the organization has changed somewhat 
 70 
 
since its foundation, this mission has largely been maintained and at the forefront of the 
organization’s operations. During the Cold War period, the NTIS was a clearinghouse of 
sorts for government reports and STI.  
Atomic Energy Commission  
As previously stated, the Atomic Energy Commission was created in 1946, in the 
aftermath of the dropping of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the 
conclusion of the Second World War, as concerns about the future state of the world and 
about the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union were beginning to 
take center stage. The organization was created within the executive branch of the United 
States government and charged with overseeing the information that had led to the 
development of nuclear weaponry and that could also presumably lead to its refinement 
and further utilization. A key part of the AEC operational focus was research into the 
effects of atomic energy and the use of nuclear weaponry (Buck, 1983). However, to 
understand the relevance of the AEC in influencing the United States’ approach to 
information management, it is necessary to delve further into the history and operations 
of the organizations like this.  
Jason Nicholas Wingerd (2000) has discussed the nature and functions of the 
AEC in considerable detail. He notes that the organization emergence was tied into the 
passing of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Congress and the President Truman 
established the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) as “an administratively 
unique government agency empowered to supervision nuclear weapons’ production and 
custody” (Wingerd 2000, p. ix).  The stated objective of the AEC was, during the Cold 
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War period, to increase the country's security plans. The focus was largely on building 
thermonuclear weapons and expanding the manufacturing complex of the country. 
Wingerd (2000) argues that this objective was set up in response to the Soviets’ success 
with the testing of their first atomic bomb in 1949. He also suggests that the Atomic 
Energy Commission represented the continuous expansion of the federal bureaucracy into 
new areas of responsibilities and thus, in various ways, it was representative of the 
mechanism for centralized resource management that the U.S. favored over the Soviet 
centralized model. Wingerd (2000) also notes that the consolidation of the armed forces 
into the Department of Defense led to some centralization of power, some effort to align 
resources in a centralized system, although a substantial degree of specialization within 
small units was still maintained. He suggests, too, that he establishment of the AEC 
pushed the federal bureaucracy into unexplored regions of responsibility, organization, 
culture, and leadership. With regard to the AEC position among other federal agencies, 
Wingerd (2000) posits the following: 
[t]he new duties the government assumed included the supervision of a 
military weapon by civilians and the potential development of a new 
commercial energy source by a federal agency. The Commission’s 
organization was a decentralized structure and consisted of a five-member 
board format, which made the AEC a unique federal bureaucracy. The 
Commission’s culture included beliefs in the civilian custody of weapons, 
collegiate decision-making, and political neutrality. The structure required 
leaders to negotiate with other Commissioners as coequals (p. 6).  
 
The apparent emphasis on collaboration in this structure again draws attention to the way 
in which the AEC operated in relation to other STI organizations in the United States.  
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Early Efforts to Coordinate STI management in the U.S. 
Although a key difference between the American and the Soviet approach to STI 
was specialization versus centralization, research demonstrates that it would be erroneous 
to think of the U.S. as having a disjointed system of agencies that has no centralization. 
Organizations such as the Committee on Scientific and Technical Information (COSATI) 
and the Commerce, Energy, NASA, Defense Information Managers Group (CENDI) 
were vital to the organization of the specialized information management systems in the 
U.S. Kent Smith (1994), in a lecture titled “Federal information policy: Putting it all 
together,” describes the operations of COSATI in relation to the management of STI 
programs in both the public and private sector. Smith (1994) references the 1963 
Weinberg Report that declared that information management was not a separate but an 
integral and inseparable part of the research and development process, suggesting how 
the importance of committees arose in response to this perspective or in 
acknowledgement of it. He suggests that “the technical community was essentially being 
told that they, the scientists and engineers along with the conventional information 
handlers, were now bonded in a new information community, in a new era of “Big 
Science”” (p. 61), again alluding to how the attitude towards STI management through 
committees began to be shared by many, partly to mitigate the issue of decentralization.  
Gallo (2008) discusses the role of the National Science Foundation (NSF) in the 
development of the U.S. information infrastructure and argues that the NSF’s role and its 
influence on the evolution of large scale scientific and technological systems was vital to 
the development and improvement of the U.S. information infrastructure. He suggests 
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that the relatively weak position of the NSF in the 1950s was also significant to the 
development of the organization and to the timeline according to which the process of 
information management was modernized. Indeed, the NSF emphasized the development 
of information and communications infrastructure information management, virtual 
simulation, and at the most fundamental level, the generation of new scientific 
knowledge. Crucially, Gallo (2008) also concludes that the NSF achieved its objective 
and sustained its vital role through its mode of operation:  
By providing support at critical and overlapping stages and junctures of 
the frontier enterprise, the NSF simultaneously fulfills its mission and 
creates lasting infrastructural traces that establish sovereignty over space 
and enables the generation of fundamental knowledge that undergirds, at 
least rhetorically, the linear model of innovation that shapes post-war 
science and technology policy in the United States (p. 3).  
 
Gallo (2008) draws attention to the way in which nuclear research was undertaken 
in the 1940s as an example, with a focus on the development of a comprehensive U.S. 
atomic program over several years. He describes how President Roosevelt established the 
Uranium Committee in 1939, which later merged into the National Defense Research 
Committee (NDRC) in 1940. He also mentions how, in 1941, the NDRC was reformed as 
the much more powerful Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), 
empowered with control of the Uranium Committee which was renamed S-1 Section. The 
S-1 Section was also reorganized and restructured into the S-1 Executive Committee in 
June 1942, allowing to focus on a nuclear weapon in cooperation with the U.S. Army. 
The subsequent change in late 1942 the S-1 Executive Committee created two sites to 
support the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ newly formed Manhattan Project, with its 
 74 
 
base in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Los Alamos, New Mexico. This is also a good 
example of the flexibility of the American approach to STI management. From it, one can 
distinctly see how specialized organizational units were by and large supported with 
committees backing up their activities and representing their interests to a more 
centralized unit in the Federal government.  
U.S. government committees like COSATI, ASTIA, and CENDI attempted to 
coordinate the U.S. STI management efforts and to represent the work of the relevant 
agencies, the NSF, NTIS, and AEC, for instance, to the government, speaking to their 
interests, their achievements, and their needs in the political forum. This model stands in 
obvious contrast with the Soviet model, where VINITI was entirely responsible for STI 
management. Yet, the work of the above-mentioned committees in the U.S., or rather 
their results, were substantial and sufficient to show that there was considerable benefit to 
having the “specialized” approach to STI so long was there was a more centralized 
mechanism for support integrated with it. Although Gallo (2008) insists that “the absence 
of a central government agency does not ipso facto necessitate the creation of one” (p. 
133), the bulk of his argument highlights how there was, in effect, a distinct group of 
central agencies created to at least represent the interests of the specialized groups to the 
Federal government, with the primary objective of ensuring that funding and other 
resource requirements were consistently met (Spencer, 2014). 
4.2. Scientific and Technical Information in the Soviet Union 
The following section outlines the emergence and the rapid rise to prominence in 
the early-to-mid- 1950s of VINITI, or the All-Union Scientific and Technical Information 
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Institute, through a review of secondary sources pertinent to the organization. VINITI is 
mostly known for beginning to produce Referativnyi Zhurnal, a Russian-language set of 
abstracting journals the first of which were initiated in the Soviet Union in 1952 
(Shamaev, 2011). They were abstracts of mostly magazine (journal) or conference 
articles, but books and patents were also included as well as unpublished "deposited" 
articles. The articles they abstracted included sixty-six different languages from 130 
different countries of the world. However, for the purposes of this research the focus here 
and in the following subsections is to address the way that information management 
through VINITI epitomized the Soviet Union drive to undertake a different approach to 
STI compared to the United States. This is done to address the first research question of 
the study that explores the root causes of what prompted the Soviets to make the decision 
to maintain a centralized information management system.  
VINITI (All-Union Institute for Scientific and Technical Information) 
VINITI has been described in the literature as a massive abstracting and 
translating service that also housed an advanced punched-card computing machine for 
searching scientific literature (Baker & Hoseeh, 1960; Bello, 1960). Created in 1952, the 
organization was said to have more than twenty thousand employees working on 
managing information by abstracting, translating, automating, and disseminating 
scientific information; organizing the information and distributing it primarily to 
communist countries to support their development and expansion. VINITI covered more 
than twelve thousand foreign journals each year. In 1959, for instance, there were more 
than 700,000 articles abstracted in many different languages, with the subtle emphasis 
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always upon working out how information could be used to advance the Soviet’s agenda 
to promote the superiority of their information management and, through it, their 
theoretical and practical scientific knowledge (Shamaev, 2007).  
Schneider (1994) undertook a substantial study of the information management of 
the Soviet Union summarized in his seminal work, Research and Development 
Management: From the Soviet Union to Russia. Schneider (1994) attests to the sporadic 
nature of interest in the research and development strategies of the Soviet Union but 
follows up this attestation with an acknowledgment that the end of the 1980s and the 
decline of the Soviet economic model was one of the factors that caused a relative 
“surge” (p. 13) of attention in the Soviet economy and what became the Russian 
economy. He argues that the “incredible investment” of the former Soviet Union in 
domestic science and research was particularly important, too, implying a clear focus on 
the development efforts of the Soviets through their information management strategies.  
Throughout the rest of the study, Schneider (1994) probes the issue of information 
management as both a concept conceived in relation to research and as a practical 
initiative that had to be carefully implemented. He considers some of the paradoxes and 
basic issues that arguably undermined the relationship between Western organizations 
and their Soviet counterparts, perhaps explaining the somewhat uneven relationship. 
Considering the Soviet style of government, Schneider (1994) conveys the impression 
that the functioning of the Soviet government was “indicative of the system’s functioning 
and [was] finally synonymous with the definition of the system” (p. 1). Schneider (1994) 
describes the fluctuation of the market economy in the “inventory of technical 
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knowledge” (p. 13) and indicates that those fluctuations were the result of changes in 
expenditure on R&D by private firms, the government, and by groups of individuals in 
universities and other for non-profit and nongovernmental research institutions.  
The significance of Schneider’s observation, however, is that it perhaps points to 
one of the reasons why the centralization of the Soviet STI management was deemed the 
preferred and the most optimal approach. With a state-funded program, the potential for 
fluctuations in funding was presumably lessened. Given the need for up-to-date and 
comprehensive information declared by the burgeoning body of technical specialists, 
scientists, and other scholars, the consistency of funding to support information 
management appears to be highly relevant.  
Ruggero Giliarevskii (1999) made a telling comment on the condition of the 
Soviet Union in a paper presented at the 1998 Conference on the History and Heritage of 
Scientific Information Systems. He observed, in particular, that the STI system of the 
Soviet Union was actually destroyed when the country disintegrated in December 1991. 
This perspective actually provides a key insight into the main research question of the 
current study, why the U.S. and the Soviet Union pursued different paths in STI 
management. Giliarevskii (1999) suggests that it was a matter of the Soviet Union being 
in a position to maintain a unique standard for STI. He argues that “[t]he Soviet Union’s 
national economy was administered by command and constructed on a departmental 
basis. This method of control was also reflected in the organizational functional structure 
and practical activity of the STI system” (p. 195). Unlike its Western capitalist rival, the 
Soviet Union allowed no room for the market principles of economy.  
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As a result, spheres of private property failed to extend firmly enough for the 
economic methods of management to take root. Unlike the United States, the Soviet 
Union had no free enterprise to meddle in the activity of STI management bodies. So, the 
Soviet Union never came close to having the circumstances for the final transition to 
information service in a purely market based context. Such a transition would have meant 
a fundamental change of the regime and—with it—the organizational structure of the 
country’s STI which was not to be implemented.  Instead, he insists, the need was created 
for a new system and the demand was there that it should be developed quickly to make 
maximum use of structures and staff from the command and control system. It does not 
seem surprising that the nature of the Soviet information structure was sufficiently tied to 
the country’s political organizational structure, its centralized administrative perspective. 
The connection was so tight, in fact, that when the political system disintegrated several 
decades later, the support structures necessary to maintain the condition of the STI, the 
VINITI, were no longer in place or at least no longer functional (Rapoport, 2006).  
This further suggests that the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet 
methods for STI were defined or at least heavily influenced by the political 
manifestations of these countries, affecting how the countries’ administrative resource 
developed. Indeed, Giliarevskii (1999) outlines quite clearly how the Soviet STI system 
emerged according to the principles stated by Lenin between 1918 and 1922, taking the 
initiative from many of his political speeches that addressed matters of scientific and 
technical information. Those communist principles were embodied in the concept of 
government but also in the STI management system at the point that VINITI was formed 
and really prospered.  
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According to Giliarevskii’s (1999) assessment, the following issues emerged in 
relation to the ideological structuring of the Soviet Union and had an impact upon the STI 
management systems which was deeply rooted in ideology, as well as in the formation 
and operation of government and subsequent power structures within the Soviet society. 
He outlines how, during periods of maximum growth, the system generated the following 
principles to control the management of resources and thus the management of scholarly 
and scientific information (p. 196):  
• Unified government control of scientific and information activity 
under the U.S.S.R. State Committee for Science and Technology. 
The development of a specialized (largely departmental) STI 
system was delegated to government ministries and departments. 
Within the republics the STI systems were the responsibility of the 
councils of ministers, while directors of factories and organizations 
supervised the work of information departments often subordinated 
to them.   
• The structure of the Soviet STI system was organized like the 
national economy. Each management level, from government 
ministries (departments) to local economy units (enterprises and 
organizations), corresponded to a certain level in the system. 
Restructuring in the national economy necessarily caused a 
reorganization of the system.   
• Coverage of all types of documentary sources for all fields of 
science and national economy. The complete coverage was a 
proclaimed goal, but in practice there was a wide difference in the 
degree of coverage in individual industries.  
• Specialization of STI agencies based on a rational division of 
functions. The specialization was two- fold: centralized, analytical, 
and synthetic processing of documents by federal and specialized 
(and partly territorial) STI agencies and decentralized delivery of 
information to users, accomplished mainly by interdisciplinary and 
regional STI agencies and information units at enterprises and 
organizations.   
• Uniform construction of the network and organization of activity 
of STI agencies and special libraries based on standardized 
reference information col- lections (federal, disciplinary, regional, 
and local).  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• Unified classification (indexing) of natural and engineering 
sciences publications by publishers and editors of special journals 
and information materials kept by STI services.   
• Use of modern technologies (computers, office automation, 
broadcast, motion pictures, and television) to improve the speed 
and quality of information services provided to scientists, 
professionals, and industrial innovators.   
• Financing virtually all expenses of information services by 
government budget. (Some self-sufficiency was required, but in 
practice it boiled down to shifting funds from one budgeted 
expenditure item to another.)  
• International cooperation in scientific and technical information 
limited because of the ideological and military-industrial 
confrontation with economically advanced countries. The forms, 
methods, and degree of realization of these principles varied in 
different phases of the system’s development.  
 
The importance of acknowledging this information is that it also lays considerable 
emphasis on the perspective that the Soviet Union was operating from a distinctly 
ideological perspective in the way that it attempted to develop and apply STI services. 
Connecting the ideological context to the practical side again also explains why there was 
such a substantial STI growth when the Soviet political infrastructure was in its prime in 
the decades immediately following the victory in World War II. The interconnection 
appears to be a condition that cannot be overestimated in its importance to understanding 
why the Soviet Union operated as it did in relation to information management.  
Nevertheless, the actual development of information systems in the Soviet Union 
was slow, despite the ideological foundation that was in place to support operations when 
they began. It was not until the late 1940s, however, as Giliarevskii (1999) suggests, that 
the major sources of scientific and engineering information were being published and 
being widely made available to scientists and engineers as well as to publishers and 
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libraries as part of the more strictly information-based structure that had a stake in how 
this type of information was collated and distributed.  
The STI systems in the Soviet Union were also, Giliarevskii (1999) suggests, set 
up through factories and design bureaus first, with “disciplinary information centers in 
some fields operated independently [and] their links sporadic and disorganized” (p. 196). 
There were high instances of duplication in the first several years, largely because of the 
bureaucratic nature of the operation. Giliarevskii points out that the coordinating 
functions of the State Committee for New Technology and the organization that 
succeeded it, the State Scientific and Technical Committee, had a limited number of 
things to publish and disseminate. There were also various attempts to make abstract 
journals available from the 1920s onwards, but that also was not really widely achieved 
until after World War II. Giliarevskii (1999) describes how, at that point (p. 196):   
files of documentation on military technology, especially rocket and radio 
engineering systems, were brought to Russia from occupied East 
Germany. The study of these materials gave powerful impetus to active 
information work in military industries. The demand for special 
information in various fields of science and industry intensified when a 
program to develop nuclear weapons, rocket technology, radar, and 
technical modernization of all military services was instituted.  
 
This point allows that there was, of course, a demand for “special information” 
and that there was thus a pressure, perhaps, for the STI systems in the Soviet Union to 
become more specialized rather than centralized. However, allusions to a degree from the 
Council of Ministers, presented in the summer of 1952 explain how the Soviets 
responded to this need. Through the degree, VINITI was established and it was created 
with a dedicated mission to publish abstract journals, providing exhaustive coverage, 
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effectively, of all of the scientific and technological literature that was being produced 
(Shamaev, 2011; Markusova, 2012).  
According to Giliarevskii (1999), beginning in 1956 VINIT began to publish 
current-awareness materials, too, and this was indicative of their global engagement from 
the early stages of the process. Also significant, however, was the way that the 
organization was further developed and its powers further defined by subsequent degrees 
from the Council of Ministers. An earlier analysis by Mikhailov, Chernyi, and 
Giliarevskii (1965) highlights how the development of information services occurred at 
industrial enterprises and scientific research institutes and how, from 1951 through to 
1955, some 230 information units emerged, with this number excluding information 
services in the defense industry, distinguishing between STI information and that which 
is perhaps more readily identifiable as classified material. Mikhailov, Chernyi, and 
Giliarevskii (1965) also mention that between 1956 and 1960, the number of information 
units produced increased by 1,631 and there was a further evolution of a network of 
specialized information centers (p. 197).  
Giliarevskii (1999) stresses that a movement to industrial management for the 
VINITI was established according to the regional principle of economic boards in the 
Soviet Union and there was increased emphasis on the development of regional scientific 
and technical bureaus in 1957, as well as central bureaus of technical information for the 
industry boards and republic information institutes in the Union republics. What this 
information points to, in particular, is the way that the Soviet Union was not necessarily 
as straightforwardly centralized as might be assumed. Although the VINITI was state-
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funded and state-run, to say that it did not promote specialization like the U.S. equivalent 
systems is perhaps misguided. The specialization may not have been subject-specific, yet 
there was specialization to a discernible degree; resources were organized so that VINITI, 
in its approach to STI, did not simply operate the vast variety of its resources at random. 
There was internal structuring that controlled or attempted to control the way that 
information was generated and disseminated.  
On the other hand, Giliarevskii (1999) insists that the resulting “swollen network” 
of regional publishers that existed across the Soviet Union was ineffective and a 
subsequent degree from the Council of Ministers in 1962 was issued to require 
centralization of publishing information materials by specialized central institutes, 
attempting to overcome the issue of a network of units that was too substantial to be 
controlled; that was not, in a word, sufficiently centralized. The degree made mandatory 
the classification of all publications and materials in natural and engineering sciences 
according to the universal decimal classification (UDC) by publishers and editors of 
scientific and engineering journals. Other decrees issued in 1964 by the Council of 
Ministers also saw the Central Institute of Patent Information, the All-Union Institute of 
Technical Information Classification and Coding (VNIIKI), and the All-Union Collection 
of Standards and Technical Specifications (VIFS), which helped to promote more 
coordinated information management (Mikhailov, Chernyi, and Giliarevskii, 1965, p. 
197).  The emphasis on the collection of foreign literature in natural and engineering 
sciences and on information agencies securing manuscripts of interest to limited groups 
of specialists were also functions that emerged for the VINITI during this period, but 
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attempts to circulate unpublished research and development documentation through 
information channels were also continued and with varying degrees of success.  
Gradually, technology helped to make the national information network of 
VINITI more effective. Giliarevskii (1999) suggests that “[e]expansion of computerized 
information processing became the main phase of further STI system development” (p. 
199). A network of computerized information centers eventually emerged, as well, with 
remote access to databases produced by national, specialized, and regional information 
services to accelerate delivery of documents to scientists, engineers, and managers. The 
integration of information became increasingly important, which would then give rise to 
a move towards automated STI systems from the late 1960s onwards.  
For the VINITI, however, most of the developments that occurred to improve the 
STI systems in place since the 1950s were behind the efforts of the American 
counterparts and still consistently tied to ideological perspectives of Socialism. The issue 
of separating the Soviet STI system from the government infrastructure was seemingly 
never addressed. Although an interdisciplinary automated STI system evolved from the 
first stage of the state system, with the distinct purpose of establishing automated services 
of the defense industries with the services at VIMI through dedicated communication 
links into a star-shaped network, the formation of the channels was utterly problematic. 
The Space Race: What Sputnik Meant for the Information War  
Determining the significance of a single development in the so-called war for 
information superiority, the successful launch of Sputnik, is difficult but important. Smith 
(1994) describes the launch of Sputnik in 1957 as a momentous event: “the USSR 
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launched a 3,000-pound Sputnik into space” (p. 60) and points out that the Americans 
responded with the founding of the National Federation of Science Abstracting and 
Indexing Services. Smith’s narrative suggests that it was in response to the success of 
Sputnik and the relative failure of the American moon rocket design attempts that U.S. 
Senator Hubert Humphrey went to Congress, to the Senate Subcommittee on Government 
Reorganization, and demanded an investigation of what the government was doing to 
stay on par with the Soviets and manage the wealth of scientific information that was 
being generated.  
Western European and U.S. scientists generally responded to Sputnik with 
surprise, despite the public announcements preceding its launch, and despite hearing 
definite predictions of the launch from the science and intelligence communities. In the 
U.S., space researchers were discouraged by their inability to launch the first satellite, 
and frustrated by the American government's lack of support of their efforts. As for the 
public reaction, Most of the general public in the West, encouraged by the media, was 
frightened by the idea of a Soviet satellite traveling overhead, with its implications about 
the strength of Soviet military rocketry. President Eisenhower was a prominent exception 
to the general anxiety. On learning of Sputnik, he said, "Now, as far as the satellite itself 
is concerned, that does not raise my apprehensions, not one iota. I see nothing at this 
moment, at this stage of development, that is significant in that development as far as 
security is concerned, except, as I pointed out, it does very definitely prove the 
possession by the Russian scientists of a very powerful thrust in their rocketry, and that is 
important” (Eisenhower, 1958, p. 730).  
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The Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev saw the satellite as proof of the victory of 
the socialist system over the capitalist system, and his statements reflected his analysis 
(Roberts, 2010). Within the Soviet Academy of Sciences, some officials echoed this 
sentiment. A. P. Aleksandrov, who later became president of the Academy, wrote that 
Sputnik began a new stage in history, when "in this region of technology socialism has 
surpassed capitalism. The scientific-technological superiority of the new more 
progressive social order is clear." An article in International Affairs reinforced this 
interpretation: "The whole world saw yet one more extraordinary, important 
demonstration of the Socialist system's superiority to the capitalist system” (Josephson, 
1990, p. 174).  
Although the first satellite flew during a year of international scientific 
cooperation, the Sputniks also demonstrated Soviet military capability. Trying to prevent 
the militarization and weaponization of space remained a top priority within the United 
Nations over the next several years, mostly revolving around the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union as the two launching nations and the two strongest military powers (U.N. General 
Assembly Resolution, 1957). While Soviet and American diplomats agreed on the 
desirability of peaceful uses of outer space, they continued to disagree on how to reach 
this goal in practice. Since each side saw the other as refusing to give up certain 
requirements that the other side found untenable, each considered the other's proposals 
for peace in outer space to be sheer propaganda (U.S. Department of State, 1958). The 
status-quo only served to exacerbate the existing diplomatic tension and led to an even 
more heated rivalry for scientific and technological information superiority amid 
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competition for greater sophistication of the scientific and technological knowledge of 
American and Soviet scientists. 
4.3. Interviews 
The following section contains analysis and interpretation of the four interviews 
conducted over the course of this research with scholars who had worked with VINITI. 
The primary objective of the interviews, as indicated in chapter three, was for the four 
scholars each to give their comparative assessment of the growth and development in 
trends related to managing scientific and technical information in the United Sates and 
Soviet Union in 1945-1969. The researcher asked the interviewees to focus on the 
similarities and differences of the two approaches and corroborate their assertions with 
anecdotal evidence whenever possible. 
Interview One 
The first of the four interviews conducted in the course of this research was with 
Bonnie Lawlor, at the time Executive Director of the National Federation of Advanced 
Information Services (NFAIS), a membership association for organizations that 
aggregate, organize, and facilitate access to authoritative information. Prior to NFAIS and 
her stint as Senior Vice President and General Manager of UMI’s Library Division (now 
ProQuest Information and Learning), Ms. Lawlor served for several decades as Executive 
Vice President of the Database Publishing Division at the Institute for Scientific 
Information (ISI – now Thomson Reuters, Healthcare & Science) where she was 
responsible for product development, production, publisher relations, editorial content, 
and worldwide sales and marketing of all of ISI’s products and services. 
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Ms. Lawlor discussed working with VINITI on various occasions and with 
various colleagues. A chemist by training, with both a bachelor and master’s degree in 
organic chemistry, Ms. Lawlor began working at the Institute for Scientific Information 
in 1967 as a chemical indexer. This work involved reading literature and creating 
abstracts and indexing chemical products for the Institute. Ms. Lawlor was involved with 
both the ASIS and NFAIS, which was formed, she suggested, out of concern over the 
launch of Sputnik and the growth in the VINITI activities, indicating that, in some ways, 
NFAIS is one of the agencies that can be considered a counterpart to a specific Soviet 
organization designed to manage scientific and technical information.  
Ms. Lawlor summarized the history of NFAIS, indicating that it was established 
in 1958 (personal communication, January 24, 2014) because President Eisenhower 
believed that science had won the war and would subsequently be instrumental for 
keeping the peace. He ordered NFAIS to support all activities related to scientific 
communications, including indexing and abstracting.  
The process of indexing and abstracting, though, which Ms. Lawlor emphasized 
repeatedly in her discussion of information management, was identified as already 
ongoing by the time that Eisenhower created NFAIS. Ms. Lawlor mentioned that there 
were already people working on indexing and abstracting across government and non-
profit organizations, “and, they didn’t want the government interfering with what they 
were doing because they felt they knew this area best” (personal communication, January 
24, 2014). However, Miles Conrad, the director of biographical abstracts and what later 
became Biosis, now part of Thompson, indicated that all the people together could be 
 89 
 
involved in abstracting and indexing; so that by establishing a federation, it would be 
easier to support those activities.  
Concern about VINITI was a factor in the organization of indexing and 
abstracting processes. Ms. Lawlor reported that a year after the formation of the NFAIS, 
Miles Conrad and Dale Barker, who managed chemical abstracts, were actively 
discussing VINITI and seeking to visit different departments and organizations, including 
the National Science Foundation, to determine what might constitute the most effective 
strategies for information management.  
Ms. Lawlor also noted that the bulk of the information that was being indexed, 
came out of Germany and that, although there was obvious concern about VINITI, it was 
not sufficient to prevent interest in information sharing or at least modeling. According to 
Ms. Lawlor, representatives from NFAIS grew determined to visit VINITI to make an 
assessment of how VINITI undertook comparable work; despite the tensions surrounding 
the situation, the competition between the American and Soviet organizations, accessing 
VINITI posed no issues, at least not any that were reported. The main purpose of the 
early visits by the NFAIS delegations was, in the words of Ms. Lawlor, to “start a dialog 
but also really to see first-hand how advanced [the Soviets] were” and also to ”get and 
eye on how [they] actually compare[d] with what we had here, and was it as, uh, fantastic 
as it was described or was it very rudimentary…I think it was really just to see first-hand, 
was it propaganda they were hearing or was it the truth” (personal communication, 
January 24, 2014). 
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Ms. Lawlor said that, although the purpose of NFAIS has changed significantly 
over the time, the general context has changed considerably as well. It was established so 
that companies who were doing indexing and abstracting could collaborate and discuss 
any problems in order to work efficiently to catch up on the backlog. The organization 
expanded, too, from the original fourteen participants. It peaked at seventy-five and, 
according to the interviewee, currently has around sixty-two members. The goal from the 
start was to promote abstracting and indexing and to manage an annual conference that 
promotes the activities of the organization, offering webinars and workshops on various 
issues in the field. Despite the multitude of tasks, the focus of NFAIS has always been 
upon documents management, organizing documents sets, data minding, and various 
forms of information analytics.  
To some extent, the scope of the organization’s activities expanded as the 
collection of the library or information center increased. What started as a concern about 
the Soviet developments, then just took on a life of its own. Ms. Lawlor observed, “in the 
60’s everybody was suffering so much… because you just could not keep up with what 
was being published.  I mean, so many new journals came out after WWII, people just 
couldn’t deal with it” (personal communication, January 24, 2014). This quote confirms 
the enormous amount of material published in the 1960s. So many new journals came out 
after World War II that it was naturally challenging to manage the information. However, 
toward end of the 1960s, the focus of conversations between those involved in 
information management shifted onto computer applications, including processing and 
new delivery mechanisms.  
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What started as a concern about the Soviet developments thus snowballed, 
evolving to respond to the overall expansion of the American information landscape. The 
point at which the main focus was concern about the Soviets seems to have been the late 
1950s and early to mid-1960s. Much beyond that, the interviewee reported, there was no 
discussion about what the Soviets were doing and what the implications of their 
achievements might be for the United States. The focus of the competition shifted from 
the early years of the organization to focusing on internal competition, however strong 
the initial impetus had been about the Soviets and their work. Ms. Lawlor even reported 
that many professional relationships involved people in the USSR who were undertaking 
similar work to manage scientific information.   
Interview Two 
The second interview conducted by the researcher was with Dr. Eugene Garfield, 
one of the leading scholars in the fields of bibliometrics and scientometrics. As the 
founder of the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) that developed and maintained 
citation databases covering thousands of academic journals in various areas of science, 
Dr. Garfield is a major contributor to the system of STI retrieval and management in the 
post-World War II United States. Dr. Garfield had a connection to VINITI through his 
work as a chemist, which eventually led him into abstracting and indexing of STI. Dr. 
Garfield commented that the name of the Institute for Scientific Information was 
influenced by the name of VINITI because at the time the organization was formed, it 
was an objective, informally at least, that the organization would do what VINITI did 
with a lot fewer people than VINITI could, which employed thousands or tens of 
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thousands specialists. The objective was to be efficient in operations and the push for this 
began with the Sputnik launch, according to Dr. Garfield.  
Having worked at a small company in the industry – dealing with scientific data – 
Dr, Garfield changed the name of his company, Eugene Garfield and Associates, into ISI 
as he felt compelled to start working to challenge VINITI, although the latter “had a 
completely different system” (personal communication, January 24, 2014).  
Dr. Garfield’s first trip to the Soviet Union was in 1961 and, although they do not 
recall visiting VINITI on that occasion, as they did later, they referred to attending an 
international congress of biochemistry and being among many visitors concerned about 
the progress of international science.  
Dr. Garfield described attending the international congress of biochemistry with 
five hundred other Americans. The focus on chemistry was important, too, as Dr. 
Garfield is a chemist by professional training and chemistry was among the primary 
scientific disciplines that VINITI dealt with. Dr. Garfield indicated that it was clearly 
necessary for the Soviets to keep up their interest and performance in chemistry if they 
wanted to keep their lead that had been proclaimed with the Sputnik launch.  
Dr. Garfield reflected on how that single event caused considerable stirring in the 
American scientific community. The Russians were always very good in physics as well, 
in addition to space industry, as Dr. Garfield indicated, and the production of the atomic 
bomb was obviously an important issue of contention, too.   
Dr. Garfield mentioned going back to Moscow in 1965. The first time he went, 
too, he described attending the Moscow Book Fair, with all the publishers present. The 
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fairs were arranged in different cities but the largest exhibition of book publishers always 
took place in Moscow. Although Dr. Garfield did not go back to visit VINITI very often, 
he remembered meeting other important figures, including Chernyi, Mikhailov, and 
Giliarevskii, and recalls himself becoming good friends with Vasily Nalimov, a 
prominent Russian information scientist who has a reputation as the founder of the area 
of scientometrics. Nalimov would often send long lists of books that he wanted and was 
unable to get from the Soviet Union. Some of them very obscure and Dr. Garfield 
describes going from book fair to book fair until he found the books.  
Asked to comment on information security, though, and whether there was any 
sense of secrecy, something being hidden, Dr. Garfield indicated that everybody was 
aware that the KGB was watching everything. “It would have been stupid if you did not 
know that,” Dr. Garfield insisted (personal communication, January 24, 2014).  
Dr. Garfield was unaware, though, that A. I. Mikhailov was at the top of the 
VINITI leadership for as long as thirty-two years, up until his death in the mid-1980s. Dr. 
Garfield indicated that he could not imagine him as the leader of VINITI, although he 
acknowledged that Mikhailov was a brilliant scholar and famous for his work on 
theoretical statistics. One of Mikhailov’s ideas that the interviewer drew attention to was 
the creation of a universal system of access to scientific and technical information across 
continents and in many different languages. Asked whether researchers were aware of the 
system and of what Mikhailov had published, Dr. Garfield indicated that he did not 
know, though he considered Mikhailov to be an internationally-minded person. 
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Overall, Dr. Garfield commented, however, that there was nothing unusual in 
what the Soviets were doing with abstracting services in the early 1950s-1960s.  The only 
difference between what was happening in the Soviet Union and what was happening in 
America, Dr. Garfield noted, was that in the U.S. there were discipline-oriented 
abstracting services.  
Dr. Garfield indicated that he was the one who said that it was necessary to cover 
all of the sciences in one place, attempting to create a quasi-centralized system of STI 
management. Dr. Garfield maintained he was also the one who went about organizing 
science citations altogether rather than creating biology, chemistry, or physics citation 
indices separately. There was some attempt to be discipline-oriented later but it was not 
very successful, Dr. Garfield concluded. 
Asked whether it was the U.S. intention to emulate the Soviet model and create a 
system of centralized information management, Dr. Garfield insisted that there was no 
need for an imitation. Nevertheless, Dr. Garfield admitted that there was certainly credit 
given to the Soviets for starting out with VINITI in the early days, even before the 
international hype over the launch of Sputnik in 1957. On the whole, though, if there was 
any imitation, Dr. Garfield suggested, it went the other way as the Soviets sought to 
follow the model that was already present here in the U.S. Dr. Garfield remarked: “When 
scientists in Russia said, ‘why don’t we have better service’, they came up with 
something specific. If you were a chemist in Russia and you were familiar with chemical 
abstracts or you were a physicist, you wanted the same as the Americans had, a similar… 
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same system, except with a lot more resources and support coming” (personal 
communication, January 24, 2014). 
Dr. Garfield also described a delegation of Russians who came to visit ISI in the 
1960s. He recalled inviting the delegation to his house and among the people there was 
someone in charge of the purchasing all the books and periodicals for the entire Soviet 
Union,-- definitely an important position. He spoke very good English, Dr. Garfield 
noted, and he had been in America during the war as part of Land Lease. He controlled 
the purchase and he knew exactly who was getting the Science Citation Index in the 
Soviet Union. There was a copyright law in the Soviet Union which permitted making an 
extraordinarily large number of copies of a foreign scientific publication but they didn’t 
make copies of the SCI because it was too difficult of a printing job. However, not 
abiding by copyright seemed to be an issue of the information management under the 
Soviet regime.  
Dr. Garfield observed that that the Russians were copying valuable current 
content locally in different places like Leningrad or Moscow. Dr. Garfield insisted that he 
never saw any copies but people used to read Current Contents as a way to keep up with 
what was going on outside Russia and Eastern Europe because for the Soviets it was a 
coveted source of information. Going outside of the Soviet Union was not a normal part 
of the information management process, though, so “they tired to get anything they could 
for free” (personal communication, January 24, 2014). 
Dr. Garfield described how many people in the United States made a substantial 
deal about how many different publications VINITI covered but it was not all that 
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significant because the U.S. were also covering what was considered significant literature 
in a core group of scientific journals. It addition, the American abstracting services 
started their publications long before the Soviets, Dr. Garfield observed, with the 
coverage going as far back as the early 1920s. 
The primary motivation for focusing on information management, though, at least 
in terms of the development of indexes and abstracts in both countries was the awareness 
that the abstracting was behind the development of scientific literature. The catching up 
involved the government giving millions and millions of dollars to Chemical Abstracts 
that could withstand competition from anyone.  There also were some grants available 
but they had to be justified.  
Due to the speedy circulation of scientific material in America, Dr. Garfield 
noted, thousands of scientists relied on Current Contents and gave up reading specialized 
publications, such as Chemical Abstracts, or Physics Abstracts and Biological abstracts.  
Worldwide, he suggested, it was the same thing, the only difference being that Soviet and 
other international scientists in the Communist bloc were copying Current Contents, and 
distributing the publication using their own channels.  That way, they could do the same 
thing as the Americans with their science and technology. Also, American scientists got 
reprint requests from the Soviet Union all the time “We know because we used to collect 
the stamps,” Garfield said. So, he posed a rhetorical question: Who was the superpower, 
then? The response was, “The superpower was clearly the United States. They were more 
advanced, producing more than anything VINITI ever produced.” 
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Dr. Garfield concluded with an observation that VINITI still had an impact on 
scientific information management, although it may not have been especially substantial 
or at least it never became particularly competitive in relation to the United States, which 
was always the more advanced player in this regard.  
Interview Three 
The third interview was conducted with Dr. Tefko Saracevic, a prominent 
American information scientist of Eastern European descent who for nearly thirty years 
was a faculty member of the School of Communication, Information and Library Studies 
at Rutgers University. Dr. Saracevic is known to have conducted substantial research on 
the information retrieval system testing and evaluation, as well as for engaging in studies 
of the human aspects of human-computer interactions, user studies, and information 
behavior studies. Originally from Croatia, Dr. Saracevic has traveled extensively and has 
been active in the field of information management within the former Soviet Union. 
During the late 1960s-early 1970s, he was also part of a team under the leadership 
of the National Science Foundation, charged with visiting Moscow and Kiev and 
establishing connections there to share relevant information and gain unique insights into 
the Soviet strategies for information management. The collaboration was earmarked as a 
political issue, as well; the meeting lasted about a week, Dr. Saracevic reported, and the 
following year, as part of the collaborative agreement, Soviet representatives were 
expected to travel to the United States at a later date to continue the process of 
information sharing between the two countries, primarily as a political gesture.  
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One of the points of the agreement, Dr. Saracevic suggested, was that the Soviets 
were to travel to the United States and there was to be a meeting of the Association for 
Information Science in Boston. Derek De Solla Price, coming from New Haven, was 
supposed to host the Soviets but only one of those Soviet representatives who was 
supposed to attend the meeting actually did come in something of a “Soviet type of 
sham” (personal communication, December 10, 2014). 
Dr. Saracevic mentioned being put on the mailing list for the Soviet Reference 
Journal, which is described as one of the main publications of VINITI. Dr. Saracevic 
acknowledged that he indeed received the journal, which had two versions, one more 
theoretical and one more practical. In one of his own articles about the relevance of 
Soviet research, Dr. Saracevic also said that he even cited somebody from the Soviet 
Union, “and the Soviets were very impressed that I cited somebody from Russia, from the 
Soviet Union” (personal communication, December 10, 2014).  
Familiarity with VINITI was a given at the time, Dr. Saracevic suggested. The 
influence of VINITI in the United States, however, was close to zero, for two reasons, 
according to the interviewee. One of the reasons was that very few people were able to 
speak or read Russian. Although VINITI translated a number of publications, the 
language barrier was still substantial. The second reason was that science in the United 
States, and in Western Europe, was considered as being ahead of the science in the Soviet 
Union, although this is not too, in many respects” (personal communication, December 
10, 2014). By being increasingly practical in their approach to research and information 
management, the Soviets fell further and further behind in theoretical work.   
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Dr. Saracevic described visiting the VINITI once and the Soviet Union only once, 
going, besides Moscow, to Kiev in the Ukraine. Tracing the Soviet interest in scientific 
and technical information, Dr. Saracevic suggested that it stretched back to Lenin, when 
the Soviets were still in the state of the civil war, in a revolutionary war as much as 
anything, and Lenin instructed Soviet foreign representatives and embassies to start 
establishing themselves around the world, to collect and convey scientific material. The 
Soviet interest in scientific and technical literature thus went back years before the 
VINITI establishment. Although it is difficult to say whether the Soviets might have been 
more advanced than the United States in their scientific knowledge during the 1930s, 
following the Great Depression, how much information was collected and what they did 
with information was at least very interesting, Dr. Saracevic admitted. He suggested that 
it is really too difficult, too complicated to try and determine whether the Soviets were 
ahead or behind of the United States.   
Dr. Saracevic also mentioned A. I. Mikhailov as an academic who was extremely 
highly regarded in the Soviet Union, the highest ranked professor in the field of 
information science in the country. Whether he had anything to do with information is 
unclear though, according to Dr. Saracevic. Yes, Mikhailov wrote a book but it was an 
“amateur-type of a book,” with most of the information copied from sources, making it 
neither influential nor an original book.  
Dr. Saracevic mentioned Vasily Nalimov, too, who was described as a talented 
scientist and someone who wrote quality material. He was also the best of them all, in the 
words of Dr. Saracevic. While in the Soviet Union, the locals were not interested in direct 
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contact with the U.S. delegation but the people who did appear in the meetings or who 
were mentioned by the Soviets were very carefully selected. The Soviet leader for the 
area of information management was not from Russia but from the Republic of Georgia.  
Along with the leaders of the American group, formally members of the National 
Science Foundation, Dr. Saracevic  described visiting the Soviet Union and finding that, 
not with a visa stamped in their passport but a piece of paper stating that they were 
entitled to enter the Soviet Union, the group was allowed into the country and housed in a 
prestigious hotel in Moscow, welcomed at the airport into a special lounge for visiting 
dignitaries that suggested the relevance of the interaction from the perspective of the 
Soviets. The actual meetings were carefully staged as well, with the Soviets on the one 
side and the American representatives on the other, followed by the engagement between 
the leaders of the information management groups. What was significant about those 
interactions was their intent. As Dr. Saracevic observed, “the whole goal was to make 
some exchange programs in which we would cooperate” (personal communication, 
December 10, 2014).  
Although Dr. Saracevic insisted that he did not perceive at the time that that 
information and proper management of information could be linked to political 
supremacy, he did suggest that both sides at least recognized the importance of the 
exchange of information and the interaction itself. There was no spying, though, Dr. 
Saracevic confirmed, although it would, he joked, be necessary to go to the secret 
archives of both countries to verify this more conclusively. The level of conversation, he 
suggested, was of “empty words on both sides” but “there were two guys sitting in the 
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back and nobody ever introduce[d] them, uh, they didn’t look at them. I looked at them a 
few times. They said nothing.  So, evidentially, there were two guys who were there to 
listen to everything, you know, and report whatever.  The Russians ignored them and 
after a while, we ignored them. But there were constantly sitting there” (personal 
communication, December 10, 2014). 
During the visit, the U.S. representatives took a particular interest in the machines 
on display in the VINITI headquarters and noted that there were Xerox machines, an 
American product, and several other types of equipment and material that were of 
interest. The display of the Soviet achievement, Dr. Saracevic said, was an important 
aspect of the visit. He stated again that they never saw Mikhailov but that Mikhailov’s 
impact was felt everywhere at VINITI and that was a point emphasized during the visit as 
well by the Soviet hosts. Dr. Saracevic noted that the VINITI, at the height of its 
operations employed thousands of people – some twenty thousand scientists, engineers, 
and outsiders who were involved in abstracting (personal communication, December 10, 
2015). There were many foreign languages used, as well. There were communications 
about computers and the application of computers, as well as information retrieval 
systems and databases. 
Dialogue was the intended product of the interaction, according to Dr. Saracevic, 
but the scope of the intention is perhaps difficult to determine because of the political 
overtones of the situation that manifest a kind of competitiveness between the Soviets 
and American delegates in attendance and those who organized the meetings. Dr. 
Saracevic noted, for instance, that the U.S. delegation never saw a single computer 
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although they were told that there were computers and other equipment. All of the 
indexing and translation was manual. Dr. Saracevic emphasized, however, that the Soviet 
coverage of the world literature, the theoretical and practical research output from around 
the world including regions such as Kyrgyzstan, Africa, and Japan was thorough and 
particularly impressive because the Americans were not interested or at least not 
attempting to undertake such work. They were not looking into the research done in these 
countries so the diversity of the Soviet interest was truly striking. 
Dr. Saracevic also discussed the Stalin library, to which he and the other delegates 
were invited. It was, he suggested, a big honor and the group had a tour. It was the 
modern part that they were invited to see, though, and then the director explained that 
there were levels of access, all the way to the sixth level. Each of the delegates was 
offered a card for the National Library and the highest level was noted as level six, at 
which they could read all of the American newspapers. Undergraduates and their 
counterparts were given level one access, with the level of access improving according to 
the rank of the individual. Looking for computers, though, Dr. Saracevic noted that there 
were not any to be seen in the library either. Visiting the Kiev offices as well, Dr. 
Saracevic observed that there were not any computers on display in that city.  
Asked whether there was any sign of anything suspicious going on behind closed 
doors, Dr. Saracevic responded that the American delegates did not think there was 
anything suspicious. Related to computers, he insisted that the Russians were secretly 
developing a computer called Minsk, which was basically a copy of the IBM 360 and 
ended up in a failure. The emphasis on copying American technology is particularly 
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important. One of the problems with the Soviets, Dr. Saracevic said, was that they did not 
focus sufficiently on trying to develop their own computing. Considering the reasons for 
the fall of the Soviet STI management system, Dr. Saracevic suggested that the lack of 
modern technology was perhaps the most striking aspect. Having a strong army and 
powerful energy-producing facilities, they lacked modern technology, particularly 
computing. It is especially perplexing because, as noted at the beginning of the interview, 
the Soviets were developing their knowledge of math and physics, but that did not 
translate into computer science until much later. The United States, on the other hand, 
appeared to have managed to translate the more theoretical, the more abstract knowledge, 
into something more practical.  
Considering whether the lack of the Soviets’ access to computers was one of the 
primary reasons why the country did not get ahead, however, Dr. Saracevic insisted that 
there were many reasons and there is not necessarily any data to substantiate the claim. 
Among several reasons, technology was probably one of the easily identifiable factors.  
The overall treatment of the delegates during the events described by Dr. 
Saracevic was definitely positive and intended to prevent further investigation; it was 
designed to give the impression that there was progress being made and that the 
communists were even further ahead in the technology race than they really were. 
Importantly, “there was no looking down.  There was respect… There was respect.  
There was no doubt about that.  Uh, and there was a feeling of collegiality [between the 
U.S. and Soviet information managers]. They were dying to go out to see the world, to 
cooperate” (personal communication, December 10, 2014). Commenting on VINITI 
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specifically, Dr. Saracevic noted that the Soviet Union undertook the VINITI as a huge 
project and published more in the STI domain than anybody else. Yet, the effect it had 
outside of the Soviet Union was negligible, even in developing countries or in the 
Communist bloc.  
Nonetheless, Dr. Saracevic also reiterated the significance of the competition 
between Soviet and American agencies in driving scientific information management 
forward. The National Science Foundation was mentioned as having received a lot of 
money from Congress as a result of the launch of Sputnik, with part of the emphasis 
being on education. A lot of funding went toward the education of physicists, computer 
scientists, engineers, and so forth, because education was perceived as constituting a 
major part of the information science program. “[After the Sputnik launch], the NSF got a 
lot of money from the Congress as a result of Sputnik, part of it was for education. And… 
a lot of money went for education [of] physicists, computer scientists, engineers, and all 
that. Plus, there was a part of information science. So, Sputnik helped us a lot” (personal 
communication, December 10, 2014). The political competition was a factor, too, in so 
far as there were Cold War politics to consider in this, but it was strategic, Dr. Saracevic 
suggested, more than it was actual, with two huge entities in the world seeking to outdo 
each other in the rhetoric of information management.  
The operations of VINITI, though, Dr. Saracevic suggested, had really no 
comparison in the world. Although American representatives, members of the American 
community for information management, were very interested in the way that VINITI 
agencies were managing information, there was no equivalent constructed in the United 
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States. Dr. Saracevic described but a brief consideration by Congress as one Chicago 
congressman insisted that there should be a VINITI-like structure and there should be a 
bill prepared for it. However, the American system was more segregated, in the words of 
Dr. Saracevic. He mentioned the National Library of Agriculture and how it did a good 
job managing agriculture information, as well as the ACM, with its digital library and its 
engagement with medicine. The American Computing Society was another organization 
mentioned for its effectiveness at information management in the United States but the 
key point made was that these organizations were distinctly separate in their areas of 
individual specialization.  
Asked whether he supported the idea that America already had in place much of 
what the Soviets were working on twenty to thirty years later, Dr. Saracevic noted that 
there was a lot of innovation done on the basis of competition on both sides, including 
scientific and technical information on computers that could be searched in any place at 
any time, even when there was no Internet. Applying computer power and internet-like 
databases to research purposes before the actual emergence of the Internet was a 
substantial achievement and Dr. Saracevic noted in the end that there was, since the late 
1960s, the expectation that the advent of the Internet was imminent, which would 
drastically change the global information management landscape. 
Interview Four 
The fourth interview took place with Dr. Toni Carbo who for a number of years 
was a professor in the School of Information Sciences and the Graduate School of Public 
and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. Dr. Carbo’s work in the 
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information field began in 1962 and includes extensive experience working with 
information service producers and users (database producers and libraries) and 
conducting research in the areas of information policy and use. Dr. Carbo is a fellow of 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the Institute of Information 
Scientists, and the National Federation of Abstracting and Information Services (NFAIS). 
During the interview, Dr. Carbo noted that she had become extremely interested in 
indexing and abstracting as part of her own research efforts and that her interest in this 
general field concerned the management, indexing, and citation analysis pertinent to 
United States and Soviet operations. During the course of her research, Dr. Carbo worked 
with the European community on indexing and she reported that a friend of hers was the 
executive director of the National Federation of Abstracting and Indexing Services in 
Philadelphia, providing work for Dr. Carbo as a consultant in Europe and later within the 
International Counsel of Scientific Unions, where Dr. Carbo met some of the people from 
different countries, including the Soviet Union, who were involved in the abstracting and 
researching work in the first place. Dr. Carbo added, “it wasn’t just indexing and 
abstracting. We got involved in teaching people how to search databases, so it was hard 
wired into our mainframe” (personal communication, November 10, 2015).  
As part of the NFAIS, Dr. Carbo worked very frequently with overseas 
organizations, including UNESCO. Part of the operations involved teaching, thus the 
sharing of knowledge and information. It also involved working with specialists to 
develop an indexing seminar and present it in European countries.  
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Several specialists from the Soviet Union were interested in abstracting and 
indexing and potentially in teaching, so it made it worthwhile to pursue the connection. 
Dr. Carbo discussed what VINITI was doing to develop indexes. She insisted that there 
was nothing particularly unique about the way in which the organization operated, noting 
that “In many cases it was following Chemical Abstracts [in the U.S.] (personal 
communication, November 10, 2015). The NSF provided some initial funding for the 
NFAIS, so the people working on developing the indexing services could get together 
and share what they were learning and continue to improve access to information. In 
terms of VINITI, Dr. Carbo said, it was not a case of trying to steal every available 
innovation but rather a case of watching and learning from what the Americans were 
doing that was unusual and vice versa. Dr. Carbo insisted that there was really no 
apprehension or caution in the relationship between the Americans and the Soviets. She 
said, “So, it was a time of a lot of change, a lot of looking at how we could better provide 
access to the information people needed using the technologies, um, in multiple 
languages” (personal communication, November 10, 2015). 
Dr. Carbo put forth the idea that the American STI organizations were all looking 
not only at the Soviets but at the organizations in Europe in general. She also described 
visiting Moscow and Leningrad – at least twice – and concentrating on scientific and 
technical information in discussions, in the sharing of information. She noted, 
emphatically, that the interaction in these places was always straightforward; there were 
normal security procedures followed and minimal stress on the way in which American 
scientists interacted with their Soviet counterparts. Dr. Carbo did not encounter any 
significant problems, though. Other than one incident concerning a dinner, Dr. Carbo 
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insisted that the experience of being in the Soviet Union as a representative of American 
science was not threatening at all.  
The exception was, an event when Dr. Carbo was headed to dinner with a group 
of fellow scientists and they were about to get on an elevator. Dr. Carbo described how it 
stopped at the floor and “there was a woman sitting right there, clearly watching who was 
going to what room and such” (personal communication, November 10, 2015). When she 
started to get on to the elevator, one of the Soviet colleagues grabbed her arm and said, 
“No.”  The warning was taken as an indication that it was not safe to go onto the elevator 
as it was full of Armenians, a rebellious nation in the North Caucasus, suggesting some 
of the tensions that were going on. Otherwise, though, Dr. Carbo insisted that the 
interactions between the American representatives and their Soviet counterparts were 
very positive, welcoming, collaborative, and productive.  
She recognized the contributions of VINITI to STI growth and dissemination in 
the 1950s-1960s: “We wouldn’t have access to the important Russian literature had 
VINITI not made that available” (personal communication, November 10, 2015). 
Language was not much of a barrier, either, in Dr. Carbo’s eyes. For many people it was, 
but there were many things that were translated just as there were databases in German 
and in other languages too. The challenge of demonstrating good English skills is brought 
up in relation to that of learning a second language, but the key point made was that the 
capacity for collaboration and shared information was substantial and VINITI’s role in it 
was crucial. 
 109 
 
Nonetheless, when asked to compare the decentralized system of STI 
management in the U.S. and the governmentally controlled system of the Soviet Union, 
Dr. Carbo commented that the U.S. approach was far superior because it was not even a 
competition. Despite decentralization, collaboration across the agencies, however, and 
across disciplines was common and even encouraged, according to Dr. Carbo’s 
assessment. There was not anyone telling them what to do or otherwise trying to restrict 
their activities. The degree of sharing was substantial, too. One of the things information 
management agencies in the United States were concerned about was that if a company 
developed a standard, then those doing research would be quite interested in learning 
more about what was being developed. There was an interest in studying technology, as 
well as what technology people were buying.  
The metaphor Dr. Carbo used was flowers, suggesting that we have to let a 
thousand flowers bloom and it was a matter of looking for the best approach and of 
finding opportunities to collaborate. The “we” in this conversation is very important 
because it refers to men and women from different backgrounds, different parts of the 
country, different types of organizations. Dr. Carbo also mentioned going to VINITI and 
attending various meetings and workshops. There were no computers, she noted, or 
photocopy machines, or access to other information. You would, on the other hand, go 
into most U.S. offices or schools, and there would be this type of access. There was a 
sense that it was very controlled, she suggested, and, of course, there was censorship. 
Obviously, Dr. Carbo acknowledged, there were some classified documents, but the 
number of such documents was hardly striking and really there was the same degree of 
censorship from the U.S., which also had some classified material.  
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Dr. Carbo noted that there were people with security clearances and she herself 
did not have access to top secret stuff, not being involved in that level of work, which 
would have included weapons research, for example. The situation was comparable in the 
Soviet Union and in the United States, though, and not everyone had access to top secret 
information there either. Still, there was, Dr. Carbo suggested, at least some sense of not 
sharing as much with the Soviets as you might with someone from the United States. 
Asked whether the Americans felt that their Soviet counterparts were archrivals or 
something to be weary of, Dr. Carbo implied that there really was not such a feeling in 
relation to developing technology; the only sense of that type of rivalry came from the 
more direct political interactions in the Cold War environment. Thus, the cautiousness 
had more to do with the Cold War propaganda than any kind of race towards the 
establishment of a superior information system because “we knew ours was better. And, I 
think that for people like me, the idea was we wished we could help our colleagues in 
Russia and the Soviet Union” (personal communication, November 10, 2015).  
There was some of that, Dr. Carbo suggested; some sense that there was a race, 
but it was secondary to the issue of the Cold War as a more general context. The 
Americans were aware that their systems were better, and it was not much of a concern to 
compete with the Soviet Union on the basis of information management strategies. 
Interestingly enough, the focus for information professionals was more on helping 
colleagues in the Soviet Union and around the globe.  
Dr. Carbo suggested that she and many of her colleagues had a feeling that once 
information technology was available, it would eventually become available to others. 
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The implication is that there was perhaps enough exposure in the Soviet Union to what 
the Americans were doing, to what they had achieved, that it was better to facilitate 
collaboration than try to keep information and technology so exclusive, particularly 
because the Americans knew that they were ahead anyway. It was not a matter of giving 
away trade secrets or secrets about military equipment. They would not give that out or 
share information that was the equivalent of a new product developed by a company; that 
type of information, again, was kept private. “But in terms of other things like education 
and, you know, scientific research, how to do mathematics better or improve 
agriculture…all of that kind of information, very definitely.  So, most information we 
think should be available, at least I do, and did” (personal communication, November 10, 
2015). Nor, in the process of sharing information, was there a single thing that Dr. Carbo 
was able to think of that the U.S. information specialists wanted to know from the Soviets 
but found themselves unable to discover.  
They were curious to learn more but the Soviet Union was interesting primarily 
because it was such a huge territory and there were so many different cultures, Dr. Carbo 
commented. There was a curiosity to learn shared by both the Americans and the Soviets. 
There were social events that also helped to try and build relationships, which Dr. Carbo 
described as all very cheerful, as indicative of a particular sense of comradery in the 
information community: “It wasn’t trying to embarrass anybody or say we’re better or 
different.  But it was, we’re human beings. And, the guys back in the Kremlin and the 
White House may have been all concerned about whatever but I think ordinary folks 
like… me, uh, were more interested in getting to know the individual and sharing 
information” (personal communication, November 10, 2015). Dr. Carbo, however, 
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insisted that it was because so much was changing technologically that there was such an 
emphasis on how to do things better in the global scheme of things.  
Dr. Carbo described trying to rethink how information was provided on the global 
scale and she discussed a process of talking to a variety of people in relevant fields in 
different countries who were facing the same problem. In all, Dr. Carbo reiterated the 
importance of collaboration, mentioning the various meetings that took place with 
colleagues from the Soviet Union, from South America, and from the U.S. and Canada.  
She also emphasized the distinction between the status of people as information- 
orientated versus those who were security-minded. The focus for those involved in 
information management, she summed up, was to try to use information, share it for the 
betterment or the greater good of society. The common goal and motivation of purely 
information professionals was to improve access to information and help people. There 
was little motivation to promote one or another political agenda. Dr. Carbo said, “all of us 
got into our field, in part, because we wanted to improve access to information, help 
people and not to defeat the evil Communist régime” (personal communication, 
November 10, 2015). 
In the conclusion of the interview, Dr. Carbo acknowledged that there were 
certainly many people in the U.S. who felt information was power and wanted to restrict 
access to it. However, her own perspective was that there was a distinction between 
different types of information: classified information or some other things that need to be 
kept protected and the more general types of information, a large part of which could and 
should be made available to all people.  
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4.4. Conclusion 
The general takeaway from the four interviews is that, contradicting the political 
rhetoric of the day, the desire to collaborate was far more common than not among the 
American and the Soviet information managers. The interviewees arrived at remarkably 
similar conclusions when they characterized the U.S.-Soviet relationship with regard to 
managing the growing body of scientific and technical information. The interviewees 
observed that there was professional interest in what the Soviets were doing in STI 
management rather than hostility, animosity, and the desire to outdo the “enemy” at all 
costs.  As the next chapter will explore further and contrary to the popular perception 
stemming from media sentiments and political propaganda, evidence suggests a 
relationship of the overall healthy competition and mutual respect between the two 
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union rather than that of hatred and 
apprehension, regarding the management of scientific and technical information in the 
mid-twentieth century.   
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter seeks to collate the information from the previous chapters to 
construct a discussion of findings pertinent to the contrast between the American and 
Soviet attitudes toward managing scientific and technical information in the wake of the 
Second World War. Conclusions are also made toward the end of this chapter in relation 
to the research questions of the study, with some attention lent to the implications of this 
research for the field of library and information science and for further study of the 
history of information management agencies, considering issues such as how the 
knowledge gleaned in the course of this research can inform and guide our approach to 
resolving the current problems of  information overload and the contemporary 
information crisis.  
5.1. Interpretation of Findings 
The four interviews conducted for this study provided a substantial amount of 
information regarding the comparison of the American and Soviet approach to managing 
the growing body of scientific and technical documents during the early Cold War period. 
As anticipated, the interviews provided a great deal of information pertinent to the 
research questions of this study: all four interviewees were in a position to speak about 
the American and Soviet mechanisms for managing research-related information. Their
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professional backgrounds are rich and diverse, involving frequent engagement with both 
the American and Soviet organizations associated with information management. 
Ms. Lawlor specifically mentioned working with colleagues in VINITI and, 
emphasizing her background in chemistry, her training as a chemist, spoke about working 
for the Institute of Scientific Information in 1967, attesting to the fact that the United 
States tended to involve various organizations in information management, concentrating 
on a mechanism of specialization rather than allowing for the kind of generalization and 
centralization that was preferred in the Soviet Union.  
Dr. Garfield spoke to working with VINITI as well, holding the position of a 
chemist. He spoke at length about working on abstracting and indexing scientific and 
technical information. His association was primarily noted to be with the Institute of 
Scientific Information, but he indicated that the name of this organization was influenced 
by VINITI, suggesting the kind of indirect way that VINITI and the Soviets in general 
tended to subtly influence the management of information in America. Although all of 
the interviewees agreed that the United States was by far superior to the Soviet Union in 
the realm of information management, with no real competition in the practical sense of 
the word, they all indicated that there was a general concern about, and interest in, the 
way that the Soviet Union information management system was operating.  
The United States was clearly interested in maintaining its advantage; although 
they may not have actually been worried about the Soviet’s capacity to advance, to 
compete with the United States in any meaningful way when it came to information 
management, a competitive spirit endured nonetheless. Dr. Garfield’s comment about the 
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influence of VINITI upon the naming of the Institute for Scientific Information is 
interesting because it appears to represent exactly the kind of indirect impact that all of 
the interviewees seemed to agree on. 
Drs. Saracevic and Carbo worked within the corporate sector, too, and their 
comments about their professional engagement and their situation illustrate how and why 
the American system of information management was less concentrated upon 
government organizations; government funding was less of a control measure and, in 
general, available to American information management organizations on a lesser scale 
compared with the massive investments in VINITI made by the Soviet Communist 
government. The Soviet system was primarily state-funded but the American system 
opted for more engagement from businesses. The interviewees’ comments about working 
in the corporate sector stress this and also draw attention to the more involved type of 
collaboration between businesses and government institutions, entities like the ISI, that 
were set up to specialize in particular fields of research.  
All four interviewees, however, described traveling to the Soviet Union and 
having some interaction and even collaboration with Soviet colleagues or counterparts. 
The issue of competition arises again, then, in these sections of the interviews. The four 
interviewees all mentioned visiting the Soviet Union on more than one occasion. Their 
impressions of the country were also largely positive. They indicated that there was a 
general willingness to share information and there appeared to be some interest in open 
collaboration with colleagues in the information management sphere. All of the 
interviewees at least alluded to the way in which the Soviet Union or its representatives 
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tended to exaggerate their position, to suggest that they had more advanced resources or 
information than they did, in fact, possess, but this practice appears to have ben 
connected more to the political competition than the scientific one.  
The interviewees seemed to speak to a distinction between the political tensions 
of the Cold War and the more common reality of interaction between information 
specialists, between scholars, and between researchers. The latter type of interaction 
appears to have been mostly positive and welcomed by both sides; although there was 
mention made of information withheld or classified, even of spying by the KGB, but 
these instances are largely general and the interviewees conveyed an overall sense that 
this was the standard, the accepted way of doing things during the period under the 
investigation. There was little sense of intimidation or feeling threatened; none of the 
interviewees really indicated that they encountered any substantial problems interacting 
with the Soviet Union colleagues in whatever capacity the interaction might have 
transpired. Several interviewees even indicated that they had friendships in the Soviet 
Union developed during the course of their work.  
Clearly, the United States was not intimidated by the technological advancements 
of the Soviet Union. Although there were repeated references made to the Soviets 
concealing certain information-- having early computers, for instance, and other 
technologies like copy machines and fax machines, the emphasis was very much upon the 
United States being technologically advanced and the Soviet Union, if anything, 
struggling to make up the difference.  
 118 
 
There was also a mention of possible publishing copyright infringement by the 
Soviets, demonstrating that there was perhaps a tendency for countries in the Eastern bloc 
to utilize resources from the West during the Cold War. There appears to have been an 
attitude in the Soviet Union that the collating of information was unavoidably linked to 
leaving aside where the information originated and any sense of ownership pertaining to 
that information.  
The frequent references to cooperation, though, and the open sharing of 
information cast a shadow of doubt on the assumption that relations between the Soviet 
Union and Western countries, the U.S. in particular, were that problematic in the 
information management realm during the Cold War period. The interviewees 
unequivocally opted to distinguish between their work and the context of their 
collaboration and the political context. They claimed that the scientific and technological 
interests and engagements fostered an entirely different perspective and a different 
attitude. Whereas there would have been and probably still is substantial concern about 
the sharing of information that might be deemed classified, the idea of sharing scientific 
and technological documents seemed far less problematic. The emphasis was, in fact, 
upon sharing such documents. All of the interviewees commented on the overwhelmingly 
positive nature of their relationship with their counterparts in the Soviet Union and 
alluded to partnerships and collaborations on the sharing of data and experimentation, for 
the sake of developing new knowledge.  
The contrast between the American and Soviet approach to information 
management came to the forefront during the Cold War period. In 1983, Marshal Nikolai 
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Ogarkov, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, insisted that the Soviet Union was likely 
to lose the Cold War because of the computer, suggesting that the Soviets were so far 
behind the Americans in the development of the computer that they had lost technical 
ground and that they were highly unlikely to make up the loss (Lubar, 1993). From this 
comment concerning the development of the computer, though, particularly in the 
broader context of the space and technology race, it seems that there was at least a subtle 
rivalry to consider by either side.  
To address the main question posed in this study, then, why did the United States 
and the Soviet Union go separate ways in their quest to manage the information overload 
and achieve information dominance? What prompted them to choose completely different 
means to essentially the same end? As one continues to ponder, the answer appears to 
come back to the matter of approach. Although there was collaboration and engagement 
across the divide of the Cold War and this was a positive situation for the time being, the 
Soviet Union appeared to have firmly stuck to its preferred its centralized approach. 
Whatever its exposure to the way that the American system operated, it was the Soviets’ 
preference to maintain a state-funded structure for the management of scientific and 
technical information.  
Although the interactions between the U.S. and the Soviet information scientists 
must have made both sides aware of the limitations associated with their specific 
agendas, neither side really appears to have felt that the disadvantages of either one of the 
applied systems were sufficient to warrant a change in their operations. The U.S. 
certainly created the closest thing to a hybrid with their emphasis on specialization 
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through a variety of different organizations and their equal emphasis on the use of 
committees to represent the interests of different organizations to the U.S. government. 
However, even this hybrid and its relative success, its durability in particular, was not 
enough to cause a system change in the Soviet Union.  
The impression of the Soviet Union’s information agency operations is very much 
that they were not only centralized but also cumbersome. The interviewees commented 
that the perceived—as well as reported—number of people that were involved in the 
transfer of information at different stages of the process was phenomenal – far too large 
to be either accurate or practical, even at a number less than what was reported. The 
reported figure was actually about 20,000 specialists employed by VINITI (Markusova, 
2012), and this figure was mentioned as reflecting the number of people involved in the 
management of indexes and abstracts in the Soviet Union, while the need for such a 
number of specialists remains questionable.  
Although the launch of Sputnik and the successful testing of nuclear weapons are 
two incidents in the history of the Soviet Union that are also mentioned in the context of 
researching these issues, in relation to the research question, these events are really 
indicative of why the Soviet focus on STI was a lost cause. Although the U.S. may have 
tapped into popular unease about the competition between the Americans and the Soviets 
and although the Soviet Union likewise may have promoted the idea that the launch of 
Sputnik and their testing of nuclear weapons was some genuine indication that the 
country was about to achieve nuclear capabilities, the reality was that the Soviet Union 
was never technologically competitive with the U.S.  All of the interviewees 
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acknowledged this. Their collective assessment of the situation of scientific knowledge 
and technological development in the Soviet Union was consistent. They assessed that 
knowledge and new technology was generated on a lesser scale than across the Atlantic.  
While the motto of the post-war world was ‘to live effectively is to live with 
adequate information’ (Wiener, 1948) and while modern life placed greater demands than 
any previous era on the process of exchanging information, with escalating concerns that 
too much information could be just as dangerous as not enough, the Soviet Cold War 
stance still never put them in a position to rival the U.S. and the communist regime was 
always going to find itself behind the Western level of progress.  
The following section addresses the sub-questions of this research study in a more 
abridged manner: 
1. What was the impact of the Cold War (delineated herein from 1945-1969) on 
information production in general, and specifically in relation to the scientific 
and technical areas? 
The response is that the impact of the Cold War on information production in general and 
in scientific and technical areas specifically was probably less substantial in itself that 
previously noted. The U.S. and Soviet organizations for STI management emerged 
immediately after the conclusion of World War II and it might be argued on that basis 
that it was really that war that created something of an overload of information, a surge in 
information production, consumption, and dissemination. During the Cold War period, as 
suggested by the emphasis on information management, on collation, on abstracting, and 
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indexing, the issue was not necessarily information production but the cataloging and 
management of existing information.  
2. What was the effect of multiple independent departments and jurisdictions 
each dealing with their own specific concerns regarding information 
gathering, processing, storing, and utilizing in the United States during the 
early years of the Cold War?  
The multiple independent departments and jurisdictions in the United States that dealt 
with information gathering, processing, sorting, and utilizing created a clear emphasis in 
the American approach to STI on specialization, which is commonly seen to counter the 
Soviet’s centralized system. However, the multiple independent departments actually 
necessitated the creation of committees that built something of a bridge between the issue 
of specialization (and its potentially isolating effects for specific departments or units) 
and that of centralization, which allowed for more of a collective management of 
information resources. 
A major outcome of this study is that it shows the distinction between the American 
and the Soviet systems to be less substantial than previously assumed, with ideas about 
the relative focus on specialization by the Americans and centralization by the Soviets as 
misguiding or at least overly simplistic. Both countries actually promoted specialization 
within STI management and both created the mechanism for centralization to deal with 
the practical issues of information funding and information sharing.  
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3. What was the effect of highly centralized government on information 
gathering, processing, storing and utilizing in the Cold War era in the Soviet 
Union?    
As stated in response to question two, the assumption that the Soviet system was lacking 
in specialization because of an emphasis on centralized government involvement in 
information gathering, processing, sorting, and utilization is erroneous. Granted, evidence 
suggests that the Soviet Union was behind the U.S. in its approach to STI and this may 
have been the result of a centralized governmental involvement; it may have been the 
product of bureaucratic limitations applied to managing STI. 
However, the Soviet Union was able to collate a large amount of information and 
to do so, relatively speaking, through a single major database that was accessible across 
multiple disciplines of science and technology. The centralized nature of the resources 
was also potentially beneficial to the general management of STI because it meant that 
there was relatively little dispute about how information management was prioritized and 
the wealth of information generated was quite impressive. Problems with disseminating 
the information relate more to the external geopolitical issues of the Soviet regime rather 
than the structure of VINITI itself. 
4. To what extent can the handling of STI during the Cold War era inform 
scientific and research data-handling processes in the digital age? 
Although the response to the previous question has to be linked to the necessary 
acknowledgment of the technological limitations of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, at the 
time of its collapse, what is generally clear from a review of the operations of both the 
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American and the Soviet mechanisms for STI management is that many of the processes 
for research data handling in the digital age originate in the Cold War period. It was 
during this period that computer technology was actively developing and that digital 
technology received more and more attention in the scientific circles. As a result, the 
persistent challenge of managing the wealth of documents produced, even what was 
already in existence, created a context in which the documents-handling processes 
became intensely important and vital; the strain upon the resources of both the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union to manage the information load meant that the emergence of digital 
technology was increasingly a prerequisite to successful STI handling.  
5.2. Outcomes and Implications for Research and Practice 
Recent decades have seen a resurgence of interest in the phenomenon of 
information overabundance spurred by the advent of the Internet and the accompanying 
avalanche of digitally produced, stored, and disseminated information. The term 
“knowledge society” has entered the discourse of scholars and practitioners alike, as they 
use this expression to describe the twenty-first century evolution of human civilization. 
Information, or knowledge society is the reality we live in in which the creation, 
distribution, and manipulation of information has become the most significant economic 
and cultural activity.  
On the flip side of the issue is, of course, the risk of suffocating in the so-called 
“data smog” of which journalist David Shenk forewarned us nearly twenty years ago 
(Shenk, 1997). One can argue that data smog can potentially be much more perilous than 
industry-induced environmental hazards because overabundance of published material—
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coming at us not only from entertainment establishments but even more so in the form of 
scholarly, scientific, and research output— is unprecedented and pervasive. Data, 
information, and knowledge are meant to enlighten society, eradicate poverty and hunger, 
cure disease, and serve the public good in many other ways. Information is indeed power 
in the twenty-first century, just as it has always been. However, if there are no 
mechanisms in place to properly manage this type of power, it threatens to get out of 
control and “become an unexpected, unwelcome part of our atmosphere, an expression 
for the noxious muck and druck of the Information age” (Bucy, 2005, p. 169). 
Is there an antidote to the global information crisis? This research has sought 
proof in history that no matter how overwhelming the problem of too much information 
may seem, there must remain hope for a brighter future. The study’s central argument is 
that if our forefathers managed to find the solution in the heat of the Cold War some 
fifty-to-seventy years ago, so should we. Rees (1964) made the following comment on 
the continuation of scientific productivity from 1945 through 1963: “Meanwhile the show 
continues and scientific research is surprisingly conducted with a large measure of 
success undaunted by the unproven allegation that… creative undertakings are stifled by 
inadequate information services” (p. 4291). What this study aims to direct attention to is 
the fact that when post-World War II scientists should have been inundated with their 
own material and their efficiency should have suffered dramatically due to the sheer 
volume of the output they were producing—it did not, and the growth of scientific and 
technical information continued at a sustained pace on both sides of the Atlantic. 
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This research draws parallels between the period under the investigation and the 
current information landscape. It shows the untapped potential of information and 
communication technologies to change the way we live, how we work and do business, 
how we do research and perceive allies and “enemies.” Its claim, corroborated by the 
interview findings, is that in the context of the information war the animosity might have 
been at least partly superfluous, stemming from and fueled by the differences in political 
agendas, social misconceptions, and economic regimes.  
Examining the formative years of agencies concerned with managing scientific 
and technical information in the middle of the twentieth century challenges historians to 
expand their analytical parameters in assessing the global impact of the Cold War era. 
The current study calls for a renewed emphasis on another, undeservedly overlooked 
dimension of the East-West battle for general superiority, the information one. The 
“battle for information dominance” that ensued between the Cold War United States and 
the Soviet Union is used in this study as a metaphor rather than an accurate 
characterization of the relationship between the two counterparts. Unlike the 
developments on the military-industrial, economic, or geopolitical front, the information 
domain left far less room for antagonism and open resentment. This research argues that 
“crushing the enemy” rhetoric should be incorporated with extreme cation into the 
discourse on the U.S. and Soviet approaches to scientific and technical information 
management. As the interviewees testified, from the information professional’s 
perspective the prevailing intention was to learn what the Soviets were doing, why they 
were doing it, and what—if anything—could be adopted on the American soil, 
strategically, programmatically, and organizationally. 
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Besides historians or political scientists, this research bears significance for many 
other individuals and groups, such as contemporary providers of scientific, technical, and 
research output, policy makers, as well as the general public. The findings point to a 
distinct feature of an information society, even in its earlier iterations: such a society not 
only affects the way people interact but it also requires the traditional organizational 
structures to be more flexible, more participatory and more decentralized. When the 
Internet makes information about governments and individuals so openly available, 
concerns arise about user privacy and fair or ethical use of such information so that it 
does not become destructive in the hands of naïve and increasingly diverse audiences 
(Lankes, 2000). This places additional pressures on customer support staff and frontline 
service providers who carry the brunt of the responsibility to educate the public about 
proper practices of handling large and varied amounts of documents.  
Now that transmission of said documents can occur instantaneously, transcending 
geographical boundaries and reaching beyond the confines (physical or virtual) of one 
information agency, it seems opportune to explore with greater scrutiny questions related 
to inter-agency collaboration, consistent data management standards, training and 
tracking programs that can foster conscious data use within user communities. In all, 
more research is needed to facilitate a standardized approach to data management that 
will ease compliance and improve management of human intellectual assets. These issues 
could very well be the focus of a number of interdisciplinary scholarly studies at the 
intersection of history, information science, and policy and ethics. Along with revisiting 
the past, the broader ambition of the current research is to provide a historical outlook 
that would inform and invigorate such endeavors in the future.  
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In more practical terms, the current study affirms the difference between the 
American and Soviet mechanisms for the management of scientific and technical 
information during the Cold War period. It also highlights the fundamental similarities in 
the overall focus and outcome of those systems, albeit with American superiority 
maintained. Although the study engages with a wealth of information previously assessed 
in relation to this topic, this complex outcome is distinct from previous assertions which 
have perhaps suggested a more categorically defined relationship between the two 
systems and a more distinct rivalry, consistent with the popular idea of the Cold War 
sociopolitical climate.  
This study argues that the state-funded Soviet information management system 
within the VINITI domain was in contrast to the United States model of having multiple 
information agencies. VINITI is shown to exemplify a centralized way of managing 
information, whereas the United States tended to specialize more and arguably to be more 
flexible in the way that it managed information. 
The four interviewees whose testimony shed insight into the operations of both 
the Soviet and American information management systems consistently suggest that, 
although there were commonalities in the way that the two systems operated and 
although there was even collaboration to some extent, the centralized information 
management system of the Soviets was largely inferior to the American system. 
References to the number of individuals involved in abstracting for the Soviet system, for 
instance, suggest problems of a bureaucratic nature. Allusions to the attempts to 
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emphasize the superiority of the Soviet system, often as part of orchestrated displays to 
American visitors, also draw attention to the perceived technological inferiority. 
Regarding the rivalry between the Americans and Soviets in the field of 
information management, it is also demonstrated by all four interviewees that there was 
less actual competition because the American superiority was widely accepted and 
considered beyond the capacity of the Soviet Union to challenge. Although the United 
States was interested in maintaining its superiority, presumably, there was never 
sufficient concern that the superiority was at risk. Also, the research conducted in the 
course of this study emphasizes that much of the funding and management of the 
American STI was organized with considerable autonomy given to the agency in 
question, government funding being allotted through grants and not overseen with the 
kind of scrutiny to which the Soviets subjected their state-funded VINITI. 
Underplaying the Cold War rivalry, too, the interviewees analyzed in this study 
indicate that the so-called Cold War mentality may have been less pronounced, at least, 
within scientific communities. Although consensus might have been that the scientific 
establishments of the United States and the Soviet Union were in intense competition, 
particularly after the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the testimony of the four interviewees is 
to the point that there was indeed widespread purposeful and friendly collaboration. 
Many of the interviewees reported having sustained relationships with their Soviet 
colleagues. There were also frequent mentions of meetings between American and Soviet 
scientists, as well as representatives of information management organizations. These 
meetings seemed to foster an understanding of the need for sharing of information, 
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thereby supporting amicable relationships. Although there were allusions to security 
concerns of American and Soviet organizations and governments, and although there 
were references, for instance, to the activities of the KGB, monitoring the movements and 
such of Americans visiting the Soviet Union, the interviewees also indicated that they did 
not have any difficulty with the surveillance and that their engagement with the Soviet 
scientific community was intensely positive.  
This information – these perspectives – serve to undermine the idea of the Cold 
War mentality by the people directly involved in STI management, suggesting a far 
greater subtlety to the relationships between the Soviets and the Americans than have 
previously been recognized. Because the United States model was considered so superior 
to the Soviet, it seems that the competition was all but nominal in nature. Moreover, the 
field of information management appears generally to have sustained its emphasis on the 
end-goal, the effective management of information. Allusions to the sharing of 
information between the Americans and the Soviets indicate that the emphasis on rivalry 
was minimal, almost non-existent; the interest was focused, rather, on the meaningful 
relationship between the two scientific communities. 
VINITI also appears to have adopted a particularly global perspective in its 
management of information. Mentioned several times is the VINITI interest in collecting 
abstracts from various different countries and in various different languages. The interest 
in doing this, at least from the perspective of the four interviewees, appears to have 
derived from the genuine interest in spreading scientific knowledge. The contribution of 
both VINITI and the American STI management agencies to indexing and organizing 
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scientific information is emphasized throughout the interviews, too, and an outcome of 
the study is also the sense that the growth of information, of knowledge, was of 
paramount importance to both parties involved.  
In addition, this study demonstrates the significance of information management 
as a common goal. The study shows that, in the Soviet Union, VINITI was entirely 
responsible for STI management. Although in the U.S. there were many agencies – the 
likes of the NSF, NTIS, and AEC were chief players among them – this study also 
suggests that it is wrong to think of these organizations as completely compartmentalized 
or isolated in the way that they were specialized. As discussed in Chapter Four, the 
United States, like the Soviet Union, managed to centralize its information management, 
to a degree. The key difference was that the United States achieved this centralization 
through the use of committees and specifically governmental committees such as 
COSATI, ASTIA, and CENDI, which attempted to coordinate the United States STI 
management efforts, especially in the early stages of the Cold War. 
Having acknowledged this, it also becomes possible to see an influence of the 
Soviet system upon the American system, although again it was quite subtle. The 
Americans, though they realized their superiority and did it consistently, still understood, 
presumably from an assessment of the Soviet system, that there were benefits to 
centralization. They also readied themselves to apply those benefits through the use of 
committees and through other efforts that helped to ensure the multiple agencies involved 
in information management were collaborating and sharing information consistently, not 
only among themselves but with the Soviets and the rest of the world as well.  
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The implications of the study are, compared to its outcomes, rather difficult to 
gauge. The results displace ideas about the nature of the relationship between the United 
States and the Soviet Union during an intensely important period in the recent history of 
human civilization. The displacement is subtle, though, which is perhaps the operative 
term: rivalry was a factor, competition was undoubtedly a factor, political differences 
were an issue in the management of scientific and technical information. Still, none of 
these issues – nor any others – appear to have stood in the way of the universal and 
sincere desire to share knowledge. This being the case, it is perhaps possible to conclude 
that the main implication of this study is the urge to reconsider and reassess the whole 
spectrum of the American and Soviet relationships during the Cold War, expanding one’s 
thinking beyond just the political and economic spheres.  
5.3. Limitations of the Study 
The scope of the operations of information management agencies during the Cold 
War period was immense. The immensity of the topic in question exposes one of the 
primary limitations of this research: that a single qualitative study undertaking historical 
analysis of primary and secondary sources cannot encapsulate the scope of the situation 
under review. The focus of the study attempts to be on the STI management evolution 
through concentration on primary and secondary sources, through the analysis of 
interviews with those who have experience that extends to the formative years of the U.S. 
and Soviet scientific and technical information domains.  As noted previously, the choice 
of the research methodology and the overall conceptual approach were determined by the 
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nature of the topic and were developed with due attention paid to the question the study 
seeks to address.  
The research aims to examine the social, technological, political, and ideological 
issues that surrounded the emergence of scientific and technical information (STI) 
systems in the post-World War II United States and Soviet Union and it has to be duly 
acknowledged that the scope of this objective is tremendous, that the focus of the 
research would have to be on the exploration of the race for information superiority 
between the United States and the Soviet Union that transpired in the middle of the 
twentieth century, but that this exploration, too, would lead to an encounter with such a 
wealth of information it would not be possible to consider all of it or include all of it with 
the kind of detail that it might actually warrant in light of the research questions and 
related sub-questions.  
The overall intent to see how varying degrees of government centralization in the 
two countries impacted their respective approaches to scientific information management 
is also deemed to be a substantial undertaking and one that could not be exhaustively 
achieved under the constraints of the current study. As the research has demonstrated, 
considering a question as broad as why the United States and the Soviet Union went 
separate ways in their quest for information dominance necessitates an exploration of first 
of all how they differed and what directions they actually took. The conclusion of this 
study is that those directions were not so very different after all and that they may well 
have arrived at essentially the same end using systems that, although they looked 
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dissimilar in certain key aspects, were in actuality quite alike or at least had much in 
common in terms of their products.  
The major limitation of this study, then, is the very fact that it attempts to address 
questions that are extremely broad and it does so, because of the issue of scope, through a 
limited degree of historical analysis of primary and secondary sources coupled with the 
analysis of a series of face-to-face interviews. The four interviews conducted allowed for 
a qualitative historical and cultural investigation of the STI management evolution, but 
the limitation of qualitative research is also that it has limited scope for application; 
generalization is challenging and certainly said generalization can never be absolute but 
only based on conjecture which can be extrapolated from conclusions drawn from the 
specific examples. With particular reference to the situation in the U.S., the study draws 
attention to the relevance of governmental committees such as COSATI, ASTIA, and 
CENDI but the scope to examine these organizations is not broad within the overall 
framework of the study. Indeed, the general availability of information pertinent to the 
operations of STI organizations is limiting to the scope of any study because the scale on 
which these organizations operated is substantial and the means to delve into their 
archives, to explore their histories, is limited by the inaccessibility of resources and the 
practicalities of time constraints.  
5.4. Conclusions  
Despite the limitations of this study, however, its implications are substantial and 
they do provide some means to begin reassessing the STI systems of the Cold War 
period.  The overall conclusion of this study is that the differences, the rivalry, and the 
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relationship between the U.S. STI management system and its Soviet counterpart were far 
less substantial than has previously been assumed. On the contrary, those information 
management systems were remarkably similar in several key respects. Although the U.S. 
maintained more of a focus on specialization, it would be an oversimplification to suggest 
that the U.S. did not have any centralized management of resources or indeed that the 
Soviets did not have specialization or failed to emphasize specialization in their 
approach. Rather, both sides operated with a balanced focus on centralization of 
resources and appropriate specialization with respect to science and technology fields.  
With regard to any sense of rivalry, too, there is a need to adjust one’s thinking 
about the Cold War mentality. All of the four interviewees featured in this study, all of 
whom had dealings with STI both in the U.S. and the Soviet Union, found that there was 
actually minimal tension: concerns were limited to classified material and military more 
than STI as a source of human knowledge in general, although there is obviously some 
overlap. Even with the overlap, though, and the potential for STI to have a bearing on a 
country’s capacity for military action, all four interviewees indicated that they were able 
to collaborate with their counterparts and that relations were, if anything, mutually 
respectful and open rather than hostile, which might perhaps be the expected norm.  
Rather than a negative rivalry, it seems that collaboration was the defining feature 
of the relationship between the U.S. and Soviet organizations involved in the 
management of information for science and technology fields. This could well have been 
because both the Americans and the Soviets were interested in observing and gathering 
information from each other and doing so provided a certain level of understanding and 
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some sense of security about respective conditions. However, from the testimonies by the 
four interviewees, it seems more likely that there as a distinction between STI in general 
and military or defense information management systems and the latter were much more 
concerned about containing information. Krupar (2000) made a point about the tensions 
between the AEC, which was of course an STI organization, and the Defense 
Department, highlighting how the two types of organizations differed and drawing 
attention to the need to distinguish the one from the other in consideration of STI and of 
the relationships between U.S. and Soviet institutions during the Cold War.  
There is perhaps even a more obvious need to reassess thinking about which of 
the systems was a failure or a success and in what way they were successful as well as 
how they might have failed. The consensus has been that the Soviet system was a failure 
and the U.S. system thrived. However, Giliarevskii (1999) states that the main 
achievement of the State STI system was manifested some twenty to thirty years later. In 
the end, the Soviet STI system proved to be productive, too, as it gave birth at the time of 
economic reform in Russia to a four-level network of information services that 
specialized in different types of documents, the acquisition of document collections, 
database generation, and supply of services to various user groups. One can argue that the 
bureaucratic barriers were not a flaw of the system itself but rather the inevitable 
consequence of the command economy and science management, to the point that it was 
inevitable that the system structure would largely replicate the organization of economic 
management in a country operating under the Communist regime.  
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Likewise, there were certainly aspects of the U.S. STI management system that 
have been overlooked and that may have been integral to its success more than the 
assumed point that it maintained specialized organizations. In terms of future research 
directions, the role of government committees requires further exploration but it raises 
questions about the similarities and differences between the two systems and definitions 
or at least assumptions about failures and successes in the system designs. Government 
departments participating in the formation of national scientific and technological 
policies created national agencies that were developed at different times and the 
allocation of funds for their activities or equipment purchases changed depending on the 
importance assigned by the government to various aspects of technological policy. There 
was no general underlying rationale behind these changes, and it appears that this idea of 
governmental control of sorts applies as readily to the U.S. STI realities as it does to the 
Soviet ones.  
At least some of the developments, the processes of STI information 
management, were reactionary. It can be argued that the development of government-
supported STI systems was reactionary in the wake of World War II. As Krupar (2000) 
notes, most of the historical studies that have examined the activities of government 
agencies – referring specifically to the NSF and AEC – do not account for how 
individuals operate, how leaders and personnel construct the organization and the culture 
of an agency, manage the interactions between these internal relations and external 
political actors, or form rationales for agency leaders and staff to resist change. 
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Although this study cannot precisely rectify this problem by developing insight 
through interviews with individuals who were involved in the operations of the U.S. and 
Soviet STI institutions, this research can provide some understanding of the human 
factor, derived from an understanding of the personalities of those who were involved in 
making policy decisions or who were involved in implementing them. Indeed, the 
interviewees commented on who they knew within the U.S. and Soviet information 
environments, which of those individuals were in positions of power or who contributed 
substantially to the advancement of STI over the course of their careers. Their insights 
draw attention to relationships, too, especially the relationships between American and 
Soviet representatives.  
Finally, by understanding that the U.S. and Soviet STI systems not only had more 
in common that previously acknowledged but that they collaborated regularly, it seems 
that much can be learned about the way in which proper information management 
practices might help overcome various tensions in a global context. Clearly, there were 
individuals as well as organizations involved in the STI management that sought to 
mitigate the tensions that are otherwise perceived to have defined the Cold War period 
and impeded collaboration, information sharing, and dissemination. The revelation of this 
study, however, is that collaborations between American and Soviet scientists were not 
only possible but common and relationships were positive in that they were productive 
and open, which is a word that the interviewees themselves used when referring to the 
access that they had both to their colleagues and to resources in the Soviet Union.  
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Although there is not a sense that access was comprehensive and although there 
was still an awareness of government surveillance to monitor exchange activities, lacking 
from the perspective communicated by the sources in this study is any sense of danger or 
any feeling that the collaboration was not desired for motives that were consistent with 
the maintenance of positive relationships.  
Thus, a major implication of this study for the field of information science and for 
the exploration of the history of information management agencies is that it exposes some 
of the previously overlooked subtleties that contradict assumptions about the Cold War 
relationships in the scientific communities of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, as well as on 
a global scale. This research effectively employs the historical perspective to invite a 
reevaluation of the Cold War impact on relationships and ideologies in application to 
information management.   
This study also draws attention to the way in which information overload or crisis 
can be managed; clearly both the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in 
their respective attempts to cope with the post-World War II information overabundance, 
and they each responded to this challenge, albeit with varying degrees of success. It is the 
further, more in-depth investigation of their collective response that can help us 
understand how we might better manage the growing amount of scientific and research 
data today and tomorrow.
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APPENDIX A 
LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Could you tell me about your experience, if any, in the Soviet Union and the 
growth of their scientific and technical information management system during 
the Cold War era (1945-1969)? 
2. What was your impression of their influence, if any, on the U.S. counterparts? 
Did the influence go both ways? 
3. Which of the U.S. information management agencies, if any, did the Soviet 
VINITI impact the most and why, in your opinion? 
4. How would you assess the impact of VINITI on developing countries? Was it any 
different from the influence on the U.S. information agencies? Why? 
5. How would you describe the relationship between the two superpowers, the US 
and Soviet Union, in terms of their struggle for information superiority? Was it a 
relationship of mutual respect and recognition of each other’s strengths, or 
perhaps fear, or despise? 
6. There is an opinion in scholarly circles that the influence actually went the other 
way around and every innovative approach or technique the Soviets did or came 
up with in the 1950s-70s—the Americans already has in place some twenty or 
thirty years ago. Would you agree or disagree with this view? Why?
 152 
 
APPENDIX B 
USC INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL
 153 
 
 
 
 
 
OFFICE OF RESEARCH COMPLIANCE 
 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD FOR HUMAN RESEARCH 
DECLARATION of NOT HUMAN SUBJECTS  
 
 
This is to certify that research proposal: Pro00059872 
 
Entitled: Empowering the Enemy: The Cold War and the East-West Battle for Information Superiority, 1945 - 
1969 
 
Submitted by:  
Principal Investigator: Stanislav (Stan) Trembach 
 College of Mass Communications & Information Science 
 Library & Information Sciences 
 1501 Greene St.  
Columbia, SC 29208  
 
was reviewed on 09/20/2016 by the Office of Research Compliance, an administrative office that supports 
the University of South Carolina Institutional Review Board (USC IRB). The Office of Research Compliance, 
on behalf of the Institutional Review Board, has determined that the referenced study meets the Not Human 
Research criteria set forth by the Code of Federal Regulations 
(45 CFR 46) of:  
 
a. the specimens and/or private information/data were not collected specifically for the currently 
proposed research project through an interaction/intervention with living individuals AND  
 
b. the investigator(s) including collaborators on the proposed research cannot readily ascertain the 
identity of the individual(s) to whom the coded private information or specimens pertain 
 
No further oversight by the USC IRB is required; however, the investigator should inform the Office of 
Research Compliance prior to making any substantive changes in the research methods, as this may alter 
the status of the project. 
 
If you have questions, contact Arlene McWhorter at arlenem@sc.edu or (803) 777-7095. 
 
 
Sincerely,  
Lisa M. Johnson 
IRB Manager 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
University of South Carolina ● 1600 Hampton Street, Suite 414 ● Columbia, South Carolina 29208 ● 803-777-7095   
An Equal Opportunity Institution 
